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Due Process Methodology and Prisoner
Exchange Treaties: Confronting an
Uncertain Calculus
Irwin P. Stotzky*
Alan C. Swan**
In late 1976 and early 1977, the United States signed treaties,
first with Mexico' and then with Canada,2 providing for the mutual
execution of penal sentences. Under the treaties, citizens of one state
convicted of crimes in another may consent to be returned to their
own countries to serve out their sentences.3 A returned prisoner beAssistant Professor of Law, University of Miami.
Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Nov. 25, 1976, United StatesMexico, T.I.A.S. No. 8718, reprinted in TaRTY wrrH MExIco ON THE EXECUTION OF
PENAL SENTENCES, S. EXEC. Doc. D, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Mexican Treaty]. The Mexican treaty was submitted to the Senate on February 15,
1977, 123 CONG. Rc. 2763 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Byrd), and ratification was advised
by the Senate on July 21, 1977, 123 CoNG. REc. 512, 553 (daily ed. July 21, 1977).
2. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, Mar. 2, 1977, United StatesCanada, reprinted in TREATY wrrH CANADA ON THE EXECUTION OF PENAL SENTENCES, §.
EXEC. Doc. H, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Treaty].
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported favorably on each treaty and
recommended that the Senate give its advice and consent. See S. EXEc. REP. No. 10,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977). Ratification was advised by the Senate on July 21, 1977.
123 CONG. REc. 512, 215-18, 12, 268-69 (daily ed. July 19, 1977).3. A prisoner is eligible for return only if both governments agree that he should
be returned. See Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. Il, paras. 3 & 4; Mexican Treaty,
supra note 1, art. IV, paras. 2 & 3. In addition, no prisoner is eligible for transfer unless
he was convicted of an offense "which would also be generally punishable as a crime
in the Receiving State." Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. II, para. a; Mexican
Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, para. 1. The Mexican treaty excludes prisoners held for
political, immigration, and military offenses, see Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art.
H, para. 4, while the Canadian treaty excludes prisoners held for immigration and
military offenses, but makes no mention of political prisoners, see Canadian Treaty,
supra note 2, art. II, para. c. Under both treaties, transfer will not be approved during
the pendency of an appeal or collateral attack on a prisoner's conviction or sentence
or prior to the expiration of the time period in which an appeal is allowed. See Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. II, para. e; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. II, para.
6.
The Mexican treaty also bars transfer of prisoners who are domiciliaries of the
transferring state, id. art. II, para. 3; the Canadian treaty makes no mention of such a
status. Both treaties exclude from transfer prisoners having less than six months to
serve when the processing of their transfer commences. See Canadian Treaty, supra
note 2, art. H, para. d; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. I1, para. 5.
The Mexican treaty is quite hazy concerning the method of transfer. For instance,
although it suggests that the prisoner must initiate the transfer through petition, see
*

**

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:733

comes eligible for parole or other reduction in the term of his confinement according to the laws of the receiving state.' The courts of that
state, however, are precluded from entertaining any proceeding
"intended to challenge, set aside, or otherwise modify convictions or
sentences handed down in the Sending State." 5 Despite interpretive
problems,6 these provisions were quite plainly intended to prevent a
id., art. II, para. 5, the Mexican treaty also suggests that every transfer is to be
"commenced by the Authority of the Transferring State," id. art. IV, para. 1, while at
the same time stating that "[niothing in this Treaty shall prevent an offender from
submitting a request to the Transferring State for consideration of his transfer," id.
The Canadian treaty, on the other hand, requires the prisoner to initiate the transfer
through application. See Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. II, para. d. In unequivocal language the Canadian treaty requires that "[e]very transfer under this Treaty
shall be commenced by a written application submitted by the Offender to the authority of the sending State." Id. art. III, para. 3.
Transferred prisoners become the responsibility of the federal government in the
receiving state. Nevertheless, any state within the transferring country may allow some
of the prisoners it holds in custody to be transferred. See id. art. II, para. 5; Mexican
Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 5.
Special provisions relating to parole, see Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV,
para. 1; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. V, para. 2, youthful offenders, see Canadian
Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 2; Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII, paras.
1 & 3, and the mentally infirm, see id. art. VIII, para. 2, are also contained in one or
both treaties.
4. See Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 1; Mexican Treaty, supra
note 1, art. V, para. 2. When a prisoner has been transferred, the original sentence
carries over to the receiving state, with deductions for good behavior in prison, labor,
and pretrial confinement. See Canadian Treaty, supranote 2, art. H, para. 8; Mexican'
Treaty, supra note 1, art. IV, para. 7. The power to grant pardon or amnesty remains
with the transferring state. See Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. IV, para. 1 (speaks
only to the power to pardon); Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. V, para. 2. With these
exceptions, the rules and practices of the receiving state determine the manner of
execution of the sentence.
5. Canadian Treaty, supranote 2, art. V. This provision and its Mexican counterpart, Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI, raise the question whether the treaty
provisions can bar judicial review in the United States of convictions or sentences
handed down in the foreign nation. Arguments have been made in several cases that
availability of some form of judicial review is required by the structure of the Constitution. See, e.g., Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 243 n.6 (1968)(Harlan,
J., concurring); Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Legal scholars
also have spoken positively on the subject. See, e.g., Hart, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REv.
1362, 1372 (1953). An argument can also be made that judicial review is a due process
requirement. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
See generally note 7 infra.
6. The Mexican treaty states, "The Transferring State shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge, modify
or set aside sentences handed down by its courts." Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art.
VI (emphasis added).
The Canadian treaty states, "The Receiving State shall have no jurisdiction over
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returned prisoner from attacking, whether by habeas corpus or otherwise, his continued imprisonment in the United States if the attack
would call his foreign conviction into question.7
any proceedings, regardless of their form, intended to challenge, set aside, or otherwise
modify convictions or sentences handed down in the Sending State." Canadian Treaty,
supra note 2, art. V (emphasis added).
Apparently, no difference in interpretation or meaning was intended by the difference in wording. The reason for excluding the word "convictions" from the Mexican
treaty is that there is no Mexican equivalent for the term "convictions or sentence."
See Penal Treaties with Mexico and Canada:Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings] (statement of Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
7. Arguably, an attack on the prisoners' continued incarceration by the United
States is not a direct attack on their Mexican or Canadian convictions or sentences as
such, since for purposes of Mexican or Canadian law the convictions and sentences
would remain inviolate. The treaties state that the returned prisoners' "civil rights in
the Receiving State" are not to be prejudiced to any greater extent than such rights
are ordinarily harmed by conviction in the receiving state. Canadian Treaty, supra
note 2, art. IV, para. 6 (speaks of not creating any "additional disability"); Mexican
Treaty, supra note 1, art. V, para. 6. These provisions could be interpreted to allow a
returned prisoner to attack his underlying conviction on due process grounds, since
otherwise his "civil rights" in the United States might be thought to be "prejudiced."
That construction, however, is strained. It leaves the provision in the Mexican
treaty bereft of any purpose beyond the limited one of preserving the transferred
prisoner's right of collateral attack in Mexico and is belied by use of the words "exclusive jurisdiction" in that treaty. Id. art. VI. It would render the parallel provision
in the Canadian treaty meaningless, since that treaty says, "the Receiving State shall
have no jurisdiction." Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. V. Such a construction
would also render pointless the specific provisions in both treaties that anticipate that
prisoners might challenge their convictions or sentences in the sending state. Thus the
treaties bar transfer of any prisoner during the pendency of appeal or collateral attack
or prior to the expiration of any time period open for appeals. See id. art. II, para. e;
Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, art. IT,
para. 6. It appears, therefore, that the essential
purpose of article VI of the Mexican treaty and article V of the Canadian treaty was
to prohibit the courts of one state from scrutinizing the judgments of the other.
The provisions protecting a returned prisoner's "civil rights" or barring any
"additional disability" have a purpose quite consistent with this conclusion. They were
apparently intended to ensure that, except for length of sentence, the returned prisoners would suffer no civil disabilities because of the foreign conviction greater than the
disabilities normal to a conviction in the United States. For example, if under Canadian or Mexican law, conviction would carry with it a loss of the right to vote or the
right to certain social welfare benefits, but conviction in the United States would not
be attended by such consequences, the provision would appear to secure to the returned prisoner the same treatment as he would have received had he been convicted
under American law.
It should be noted, in addition, that the implementing legislation, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2256(1) (West Supp. 1978), adds to the jurisdictional statutes relating to habeas
corpus language that is essentially the same as article VI of the Mexican treaty. This
presumably would confirm the interpretation of the treaty noted above.
Finally, Congress has made no attempt to modify any other provision of title 28
of the United States Code pertaining to the jurisdiction of the federal district courts.
Since the language added to the habeas corpus jurisdiction statutes is the same as that

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:733

The Canadian treaty appears genuinely intended to aid prisoner
rehabilitation, parolee supervision, and law enforcement cooperation
between the two countries.8 The Mexican treaty, however, is principally a response to both popular and congressional concern with allegations that Americans in Mexican jails were subject to intolerable
living conditions, acts of brutality, and extortion by prison officials
and fellow prisoners More significantly, congressional and State
Department investigations indicate that some Mexican convictions
contained in the treaty-the sending country has "exclusive jurisdiction"-that addition was presumably thought sufficient to foreclose resort to any other jurisdictional
grant. While the thought is perhaps novel-Congress has not very often sought to
foreclose habeas while leaving other jurisdictional grants untouched-it is arguable
that other jurisdictional grants, if otherwise applicable, still remain open, with the
courts free to compel release of the prisoner through a mandatory injunction. This
would certainly subvert the fair intendment of the treaty.
8. There have been no allegations whatsoever either in congressional hearings or
the media that Canada has treated Americans imprisoned in Canada in any manner
comparable to the alleged mistreatment by Mexico of Americans imprisoned in that
country. See notes 9 & 12 infra. With regard to the purpose of the Canadian treaty,
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations stated,
The purposes of these treaties are: the social rehabilitation of prisoners
held in foreign jails; improvement in the relationships between the United
States and Mexico and Canada due to the removal of strain caused by the
incarceration of the nationals of the States in the jails of another; and, in
the case of Canada,the improved supervision of foreign nationals on parole.
[The Canadian] Treaty, unlike the one with Mexico, did not come
about as a result of drug enforcement efforts, adverse prison conditions or
publicity. The Canadian authorities originated the idea in order to promote
rehabilitation of parolees.
S. EXEC. REP. No. 10, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1977)(emphasis added).
9. The following description of the Mexican prison system is a good example:
Mexican prisons operate on a "faena system." The Mexican Government supplies prisoners with the barest necessities for only a marginal standard of living. Prisoners must purchase food if they are to have an adequate,
not to mention well-balanced, diet. Necessary clothing must be purchased,
and even cells-for those who wish to avoid unsanitary, overcrowded cell
assignments-cost a modest $1,000.
Mexican prisons depend upon prisoners to run individual cell blocks.
These "mayors" notoriously take full advantage of their authority to extract
large sums of money from prisoners. The prisoner's only alternative to this
kind of pay-off system necessitates putting up with harassment, beatings,
robbery, and deprivation.
Both the faena system and the mayoral system impose considerable
hardship on American prisoners and their families. . . . To guards, Mexican
prison authorities, and other Mexican prisoners, American citizens represent
"walking cash registers". . . who must buy everything from toilet paper to
a good night's sleep. Unfortunately, the hardship extends beyond the prisoners, themselves, to family and friends in the United States who must provide
large amounts of survival money.
Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 7-8 (statement of Rep. Stark).
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may have been obtained in open violation of both Mexican law and
American constitutional standards." Confessions obtained by torture, confessions contained in Spanish language documents that were
misrepresented to the prisoners, the lack or inadequacy of counsel,
and the absence of a speedy trial are among the principal allegations.

12

10. See, e.g., CONsTrruCION POLITICA

DE

Los ESTADOS UNmos MExcANoS art. 20,

§ VIfI (Mex.), translatedin J. WHELESS, COmPFDIUM OF THE LAW OF MEXICO 9 (2d ed.
rev. 1938): "He shall be tried within four months in case of crimes the maximum
penalty for which does not exceed two years imprisonment; and within one year if the
maximum penalty exceeds that time."
11. Well before the treaties were even contemplated, Congress became concerned
with both the manner in which Mexican convictions were obtained and the treatment
of American citizens imprisoned in Mexican jails. See generally U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on InternationalPoliticaland Military
Affairs of the House Comm. on InternationalRelations (pts. I-IfI), 94th Cong., 1st &
2d Sess. (1975-1976) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
12. As of January 1, 1975, the State Department reports that 515 U.S.
citizens currently are incarcerated in prisons throughout Mexico.. . . [W]e
Of [these] cases
have collected information on 159 of these cases ....
there are: 60 cases of alleged self-incrimination in which the individuals were
either not informed of their rights against this, or told specifically that they
"had no rights"; 61 cases in which individuals who were forced to sign confessions in Spanish specifically state that they did so without benefit of an
interpreter; 96 cases in which individuals allege that physical torture was
used to coerce a confession; and 80 cases in which individuals allege that they
were held "incommunicado" and denied access to the U.S. Embassy.
Individuals state that they were denied access to the U.S. Embassy
and/or legal representation for periods extending beyond 72 hours, in 46
cases; 23 cases in which individuals were incarcerated for over 1 year before
receiving a sentence; 19 cases in which individuals state that their court
procedures were held without an interpreter; 21 cases in which individuals
allege that they were denied access to information pertinent to their defense;
17 cases in which individuals state that they did not receive a list of public
defenders by the Mexican Federal Police; 18 cases in which the arrestees
state that they were not informed of the nature and cause of the charges
against them; 33 cases in which individuals allege that their property was
confiscated and they did not receive a receipt; 50 cases in which individuals
specifically state that they had been physically abused during their incarceration in the prisons; and 68 cases in which individuals complain of extortion
by attorneys for amounts ranging from $1,000 to over $25,000.
Id. (pt. I) at 5 (remarks of Rep. Stark).
One particularly notorious prison has been reformed. The commandant was removed from office and the chief of guards imprisoned on charges of corrupt practices.
Also, a new acting director was appointed with specific directions to eliminate abuses.
See id. (pt. TI) at 5. As of June 1, 1976, there were 603 American citizens who were
prisoners in Mexico, and 490 of them were being held in drug-related cases. Of the 490,
approximately 200 had already been convicted, and the remainder were awaiting the
start or completion of their trials. See id. (pt. M) at 23. According to an earlier
estimate, approximately one-half of the drug-related cases pertained to trafficking in
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Against this background the treaties pose two broad constitutional 4uestions. First, assuming that the foreign conviction was obtained in a manner that would have violated the United States Constitution if trial had taken place in this country, does the requirement
that returned prisoners serve out their foreign sentences in American
jails violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment? Second,
can American courts be foreclosed constitutionally from judging that
question?
In the first part of the Article we examine the jurisdictional
question. Because, under our analysis, the juridictional and due process questions tend to converge, however, we also outline the course
of our due process inquiry with special attention to its jurisprudential
underpinnings.
In the second part of the Article we undertake to
assay the urgency
and weight of the due process claims that the
returned prisoners will doubtless raise, and in the third part we review the countervailing interests. Finally, in the fourth part, we undertake to resolve this conflict, concluding with a return to the critical issue that is common to both the jurisdictional and due process
questions: the conflict between the interests of those prisoners who
have been returned to the United States and those who remain in
foreign prisons.
I.

JURISDICTION AND THE MODE OF
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS

A.

CLOSURE OF THE COURTS

Turning initially to the jurisdictional question, we start with the
general assumption that so long as the conditions specified in the
suspension clause' 3 are unmet, some court-state or federal-must be
open to pass upon the constitutionality of a federal prisoner's incarceration."4 Under this assumption, Congress' power to define, and
marijuana and another twenty percent involved trafficking in cocaine. See id. (pt. I)

at 17.
13. The suspension clause provides that "[tihe Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
14. This conclusion rests on the very respectable opinion that, from usage at
least, the Constitution requires that there be some court with habeas jurisdiction over
federal prisoners if the conditions for suspension are unmet. See, e.g., Eisentrager v.
Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that Congress is under an obligation
to rest habeas jurisdiction in at least one federal court), rev'd on other grounds sub

nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Hart, supranote 5, at 1372. See also
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (judicial review

required as part of the notion of "due process"). If this conclusion were not sound, our
problem would largely disappear. All that would remain is the question whether the
treaty is a self-executing suspension or whether legislation is necessary.
The argument that there must be some court open to hear the prisoners' corn-
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hence to withdraw cases from, the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts and its power to exclude the state courts from jurisdiction in
otherwise proper cases 5 may not be used to foreclose totally judicial
plaints is supported not only by the history and usage of the writ of habeas corpus,
but also by the structure of the Constitution. Historically, the underlying philosophy
of limited government played a significant role in the framers' decision to protect
habeas corpus against "suspension" by the Congress. This decision and its rationale
strongly suggest that the framers believed that some court would remain open for
federal prisoners through the use of habeas corpus. See, e.g., Developments in the
Law--FederalHabeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. Rav. 1038, 1263-74 (1970). If not, arbitrary
federal imprisonment and the notion of limited government would collide head-on. For
divergent views of the historic role of federal habeas corpus, see Bator, Finality in
Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARv. L. REv. 441
(1963); Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise in
Federalism, 7 UTAH L. RIv. 423 (1961); Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. Rlv. 142, 170-71 (1970); Hart, The
Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 84 (1959); Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-HabeasCorpus, 64 MiCH.
L. REv. 451 (1966); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Import of an Abortive State
Proceeding, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 1315 (1961). For an intriguing comparison of the Warren
and Burger Courts' response to reforms in criminal procedure through an analysis of
their habeas corpus decisions, see Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977).
In addition, use of the writ has made a guarantee of access to some habeas review
for federal prisoners seem rather modest. At common law, habeas corpus lay only to
attack the "jurisdiction" of the sentencing court. See, e.g., Herrick v. Smith, 67 Mass.
(1 Gray) 1, 49 (1854) ("But where it appears on the face of the proceedings, that the
magistrate had no jurisdiction, the proceedings are wholly void, the commitment is
without authority, and the party committed is entitled to be discharged from his
imprisonment without reversal of the judgment."). But the term "jurisdiction" has
proven to be very elastic. See, e.g., Sunal v. Lange, 332 U.S. 174 (1947) (implying that
any constitutional error is cognizable in habeas corpus); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938) (federal conviction of a defendant who was denied right to counsel exceeded
jurisdiction of the court); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879) (dictum) (a federal
conviction under an unconstitutional statute is void for want of jurisdiction); Ex parte
Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) (federal detention under a second sentence for
the same crime void as beyond the jurisdiction of the court).
The expansion of fourteenth amendment due process requirements magnified the
importance of the writ. The application to the states of selected provisions of the Bill
of Rights-the right to counsel, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures, and the privilege against self-incrimination-occurred during a period in
which the kinds of illegalities that habeas corpus would remedy were expanding. As a
result, the writ now serves as a means by which the federal judiciary supervises state
court interpretation of the Constitution. Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963),
with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
For a view that both the structure of the Constitution and the supremacy clause
require some access to judicial review, see Note, ConstitutionalProblem in the Execution of Penal Sentences: The Mexican-American PrisonerTransfer Treaty, 90 HAv.
L. REv. 1500, 1511-17 (1977).
15. That power rests, of course, on article HI of the Constitution, which provides that "the judicial power of the United States shall be vested.., in such inferior
courts as Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. HI,
§ 1.
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scrutiny. Although not a direct or literal emanation of the suspension
clause,"6 this assumption certainly finds support in its injunction."
More directly, the assumption is rooted in an historical tradition
buttressed by cases suggesting that Congress' power may not be exercised to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law." Further, the assumption gains support from those
cases in which the courts, presuming that Congress did not intend to
deprive a person of his constitutional rights and relying upon the
separability of a provision denying jurisdiction, turned first to an
ascertainment of whether a deprivation had, in fact, occurred before
judging the validity of the purported closure. 9 Finally, if the Mexican
and Canadian treaties cannot escape the strictures of this assumption, they cannot escape by a construction that leaves state courts
open to hear the returned prisoners' claims."
16. Given the fact that Congress possesses the power to establish federal courts,
it is simply wrong to contend that the suspension clause by itself either confers jurisdiction on federal courts or limits congressional power to curtail such jurisdiction. See Ex
parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 74, 94 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[T]he power to
award the writ by any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written
law.,"). In Bollman, Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the writ would have been
unavailable in federal court if.jurisdiction to issue it had not been granted to the
federal courts by Congress. Id. at 95; accord, Shirakura v. Royal, 89 F. Supp. 713, 71415 (D.D.C. 1949). But see Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965-66 (D.C. Cir.
1949), rev'd on othergrounds sub. nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
See generally Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131,
135 (1934); Palmore v. Superior Court, 515 F.2d 1294, 1301-04 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en
banc), vacated and remanded, 426 U.S. 932 (1976) (acknowledging that the limit of
congressional control over federal jurisdiction in regard to the suspension clause is an
unresolved issue but refusing to determine its boundaries).
17. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 5, at 1397-98.
18. See Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948)
(Congress' power over jurisdiction held subject to the limitations of due process).
Compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872), with Ex prteMcCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). See generally P. BATOR, P. MisHKIN, D. SHM'mo, &
H. WECHSLER, HART & WEcHsLE'S THE FEDERAL COUMRs AND TIE FEDERAL SYSTEM 31516, 322-24 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WEcHSLER].
19. See Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58, 65 (4th Cir. 1948) ("Whether
the denial of jurisdiction would be valid if the provision striking down the claims were
invalid is a question which does not arise."); cf. Battaglia v. General Motors Corp.,
169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948) ("[R]egardless of whether [the jurisdictional provision] had an independent end in itself, if one of its effects would be to deprive the
appellants of property without due process or just compensation, it would be invalid.")
(footnote omitted).
20. If the language of the treaties suffices to foreclose federal court review, see
note 7 supra, it presumably also covers the state courts. According to testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, however, the treaties were not intended to
be self-executing. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 50 (statement of Peter Flaherty, Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice). In addition, Congress acted
contrary to its usual practice when intending to foreclose the exercise of jurisdiction
by the state courts by making no reference whatsoever to state courts in the imple-
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Having struck this ominous note, we hasten to emphasize our
reason for doing so. We do not imply that the proscription on total
closure warrants the conclusion, without further analysis, that the
Mexican and Canadian treaties are invalid. It serves only to warn
that such a conclusion may result. Categorical expressions aside, the
general proscription is not the end, but the beginning of analysis.
One much discussed possibility is that the returned prisoners, by
consenting to their return, may be deemed to have waived either the
right to their liberty or, at least, the right to seek judicial vindication
of that liberty." Since there are numerous situations in which a criminal defendant can waive federal habeas corpus review of alleged constitutional defects in his conviction or sentence," provided he does
menting legislation. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (West Supp. 1978). In other words, neither
the treaty nor the legislation appears explicitly to preclude a returned prisoner from
petitioning a state court with jurisdiction in habeas corpus. In general, the better view
is that, with the federal courts closed to habeas, the state courts may, notwithstanding
Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1872), issue the writ on behalf of a federal
prisoner, see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 18, at 428. The fact that such an
exercise of jurisdiction would be contrary to the intent of a treaty may, under the
reasoning of Tarble's Case, warrant a different result. In all events, any attempt at the
exercise of such jurisdiction would seem foreclosed by Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S.
429 (1968).
21. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 31-32 (statement of John L. Hill,
Attorney General, State of Texas); id. at 49 (statement of Herbert J. Hansell, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State); Note, supra note 14, at 1523-27.
22. A valid guilty plea may, under proper circumstances, cut off a defendant's
right to federal habeas review. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); Brady
v. United States, 379 U.S. 742 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
But see Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21
(1974); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973). It has even been suggested that a
conviction based upon a valid guilty plea to a charge under a statute punishing conduct
later found to be constitutionally protected should bar collateral relief. See Ellis v.
Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting). In all of these cases, however, there
is a great deal of confusion as to which claims survive a guilty plea and which do not.
See generally Alschuler, The Supreme Court, The Defense Attorney, and the Guilty
Plea, 47 U. CoLo. L. Rzv. 1, 34-37 (1975). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
Some other constitutional and statutory claims also may be waived. See, e.g.,
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (waiver of right to assistance of counsel). For
example, an accused who elects to take the stand in his own criminal trial in effect
waives the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination as to matters his
testimony reveals. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). When he voluntarily and intelligently pleads guilty to criminal charges he waives the right to a trial by
jury or judge in which the prosecution has the burden of proof and in which he is
entitled to confront adverse witnesses and produce witnesses in his own behalf. See
id. Nevertheless, the lack of jurisdiction in a court may not be waived, see, e.g.,
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30-31 (1974); United States v. Spada, 331 F.2d 995,
996 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 865 (1964), nor may a challenge to the voluntariness of a waiver, see Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942) ("And if his plea was
so coerced as to deprive it of validity to support the conviction, the coercion likewise
deprived it of validity as a waiver of his right to assail the conviction."). See generally
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two questions arise: does the

prisoners' consent fit the American law concept of waiver, and can it
be viewed as voluntary?
With respect to at least some prisoners, it is far from certain that
their consents, even if tantamount to "waivers," will be construed as
voluntary. 4 And this problem is not alleviated by the procedural
Cover & Aleinikoff, supranote 14; Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure:A Brief for More

Careful Analysis, 55 TFx. L. REV. 193 (1977).
23. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Application of the waiver standard to guilty pleas meant that such pleas must be both freely entered into and
"knowing intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances
and likely consequences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Brady
adopted the test set forth by Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the
court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats
(or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that
are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)."
Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd
on othergrounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759
(1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), sometimes referred to as
the "Brady Trilogy," have been cited as establishing that for most purposes a voluntary guilty plea entered upon advice of counsel operates as a "break in the chain of
events" that cuts off a criminal defendant's right to raise through federal habeas
"independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the entry of the guilty plea." Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973);
see note 22 supra. For the view that these cases dilute the waiver standard for judging
guilty pleas, see Alschuler, supra note 22.
In a similar vein, the Court appears to have diluted the waiver standard enunciated in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977);
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976);
Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia: ProceduralDefaults by Reasonably Incompetent
Counsel, 62 MINN. L. Rav. 341 (1978). As noted by Justice Brennan, however, the Court
has never disagreed with the major principle of Noia: "[I]n considering a petition for
the writ of habeas corpus, federal courts possess the power to look beyond a state
procedural forfeiture in order to entertain the contention that a defendant's constitutional rights have been abridged." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 100 n.2 (1977)
(dissenting opinion) (emphasis in original).
24. In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), the defendant failed to appeal his
allegedly unconstitutional state conviction, fearing that upon a successful appeal he
would be retried and possibly sentenced to death. In the context of this "grisly choice,"
the Court thought that his decision was not a waiver that would foreclose federal
habeas review. Although the Noia Court did not set guidelines on how to distinguish
strategic waivers from "grisly choices," subsequent lower court cases have elaborated
the concept of "grisly choice." See, e.g., Whitus v. Balcum, 333 F.2d 496 (5th Cir.
1964).
In United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), the Court held that a provision
in the Federal Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (1966), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §
1201(a) (1976), under which only a jury could impose the death penalty, had an imper-
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safeguards with which the effectuating statute surrounds the granting
of consent." Far more serious, however, is the problem of fitting the
prisoners' consent into the basic concept of waiver as known to our
law. In cases dealing with a waiver of the right to federal habeas
review, the criminal defendant has always had a genuine choice: to
stand upon his constitutional rights or to relinquish those rights and
gain some other benefit, such as a tactical litigation advantage or the
avoidance of the expense and public notoriety of trial.26 This quid pro
quo is critical; so long as waiver, in our law, means the conscious
relinquishment of a right, there must be a right to be relinquished.
There must, in other words, be an actual choice between the right and
some other status or condition devoid of the right. Were this not so,
we would abandon the requirement of voluntariness. If state of
mind-the absence of voluntariness-can affect the validity of a
waiver, it must be because a waiver involves the making of a choice
that could be impaired by coercion. Yet, in the case of the treaties,
no such choice exists. There is no possibility that, by forgoing the
opportunity to return to the United States in return for relinquishing
his constitutional rights, a prisoner could thereby secure those rights.
missible chilling effect on the defendant's "Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty"
and his "Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial." 390 U.S. at 581. Thus, his
waiver of those rights was not voluntary. This decision was followed by Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), where under the same statutory provision, the defendant
first pleaded not guilty and then changed his plea upon learning that his coconspirator
had also pleaded guilty and would testify against him. See id. at 743. After Jackson
was decided, Brady challenged his conviction on the ground that the death penalty
provision of the Act was the decisive consideration that caused him to plead guilty and
waive his constitutional right to trial. See id. at 744-45. The Act, in short, had had
precisely the chilling effect, or, as he put it, "coercive effect," that the Court in Jackson
had predicted. This argument was rejected by the Court, which emphasized that, in
Jackson, the reference to a "chilling effect" had been distinguished from a "coercive
effect." The existence of the latter was, the Court said, to be gleaned from all the
circumstances of the case. See id. at 749. In Brady's situation, the coconspirator's plea
and the attendant strengthening of the prosecutor's case was viewed as the overriding
inducement for the plea. See id. at 756. That, in turn, was the kind of inducement that
normally and properly undergirds guilty pleas.
Under the authority of these cases, it can be argued that some of the Mexican and
Canadian prisoners face such a "grisly" alternative that the benefits of removal to the
United States work a subtle form of coercion rendering the required relinquishment of
their rights something less than voluntary. If viewed in this way Brady may be distinguishable. In the prisoners' cases, unlike Brady, there are no factors other than the
governmental demand that created the "grisly choice"-the treaty-to explain the
waiver. Moreover, Brady's rejection of the implications of Jackson was precipitated
largely by the doubts those implications would have cast on all plea bargaining, a fear
that obviously does not exist in the prisoners' cases.
For discussions of waiver, see Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 14; Dix, supra note
22.
25. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 4108-4109 (West Supp. 1978).
26. See cases cited notes 22-24 supra.
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If he refuses to return to the United States because he does not wish
to relinquish his constitutional rights, he must remain in the foreign
jail wholly bereft of any rights upon which to insist. Stated another
way, the government, as a condition to returning a prisoner, insists
that he consent to forgo his constitutional rights. Perhaps this demand is entirely proper. If so, the prisoner cannot repudiate the condition once he is returned to the United States and is in a position to
assert his rights. But it would deprive words of all meaning to rest
the validity of that condition on the fiction that the prisoner deliberately chose to forgo his rights when, in fact, had he chosen not to do
so, he still would have had no rights. The prisoner's consent only
means that he prefers to stay in an American rather than a foreign
jail; in other words, that removal is not against his will.Y Such consent cannot validate the prisoner's condition. That is a wholly separate matter requiring a judgment whether, in light of the importance
assigned the constitutional rights of which the prisoner is deprived by
the condition, it is proper for our government to exact such a price
in return for its largesse. In short, the problem is, if anything, a
question of unconstitutional conditions, and not a problem that can
be resolved by resort to the concept of waiver.
If this is true, we would seem to confront a basic question regarding the proper characterization of our problem. Can we simply
recharacterize the treaty provisions as a condition of the grant of
a governmental benefit and then, by finding that condition valid,
avoid the historical proscription on the total closure of the American
courts? Is this resort to characterization legitimate, or is it a mere
sleight-of-hand to avoid a basic constitutional precept? The legitimacy of using characterization to move a problem from one legal
rubric to another turns, we suggest, on whether the new rubric allows
for a more holistic view of the matter-whether it enhances our ability to see the problem in all of the ways that it actually impinges on
social policy, constitutional values, and juridical principles. By this
test, our recharacterization is entirely legitimate.
Initially, the question of unconstitutional conditions calls to
mind cases dealing with executive pardons and the closely related
matter of parole. The long-established power of the President to
commute a death sentence into a lesser penaltys is nothing other
than the conferral of the benefit of a pardon on condition that the
27. Some prisoners may prefer not to be transferred. For example, the absence
of forced labor and the opportunities for conjugal visits, see House Hearings (pt. MI),
supra note 11, at 21, may be strong enough incentives for some prisoners to wish to
remain in Mexican prisons. The Canadian prison system is not open to the same
charges of abuse as the Mexican prison system.
28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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prisoner serve the alternative sentence specified.29 Parole, which has
its historical origins in the pardoning power of the executive, 3 likewise constitutes the conferral of a benefit that is almost invariably
attended by conditions. Although it is often said that neither a parole
nor a pardon can be granted subject to conditions that "otherwise
offend the Constitution,"'" the lower courts have held that not every
condition that infringes in some way upon the full and free exercise
of a constitutional right is invalid." Unfortunately, however, none
of these cases permits us to draw ready parallels to our situation. It
is doubtful, for example, that the President could commute a sentence on condition that the prisoner forgo his right to challenge by
habeas corpus the validity of the very conviction or sentence to which
the commutation relates. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Schick v.
Reed 3l issued an inconclusive, but nevertheless notable, warning that
any benefit conditioned upon the total relinquishment of the "privilege" of habeas corpus might encounter a far more categorical objection than any of the partial infringements with which the courts had
dealt thus far.m And consistent with the object of seeking the widest
possible perspective on our problem, this conclusion is bolstered by
the basic precept that some court must remain open to a federal
prisoner.
Yet the fact remains that in all of the pardon and parole cases
the courts were willing to tolerate some conditional impairment of a
prisoner's constitutional rights; although a prisoner is not wholly be29. See Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256 (1974); Exparte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
307 (1855). See generally Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595
(1960); Comment, Another Look at UnconstitutionalConditions, 117 U. PA. L. REv.

144 (1968).
30. See C. NowMAN, SOURCEBOOK ON PROBATION, PAOE AND PARDONS 3-37 (3d
,ed. 1968)
31. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 266 (1974). See generallyMorrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471 (1972).
32. See, e.g., Berrigan v. Sigler, 499 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (parole board's
prohibition on travel to Hanoi upheld against an alleged infringement of the constitu-

tional right to travel); Bricker v. Michigan Parole Bd., 405 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. Mich.
1975) (requirement that a parolee not work for specified firms upheld against first
amendment attack); Hoffa v. Saxbe, 378 F. Supp. 1221 (D.D.C. 1974) (pardon condi-

tioned upon an agreement not to participate in union management until 1980 upheld
against a claimed infringement on first amendment right of association). But see
Hyland v. Procunier, 311 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (requirement of parole officer

approval before parolee could give public speech held invalid prior restraint on first
amendment rights).
33. 419 U.S. 256 (1974).
34.

Chief Justice Burger recalled that prerevolutionary English practice had

changed as needed "to avoid [the] abuse and misuse" of the pardon power and that
Parliament had prohibited the issuance of pardons for anyone who transported a
prisoner overseas to evade the Habeas Corpus Act. This prohibition, the Chief Justice
explained, was imposed "because to allow such pardons would drain the Great Writ
of its vitality." Id. at 260.
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reft of rights he is not like other citizens." This distinction is a fair
invitation for us to consider the special factual context surrounding
the returned prisoners under the Canadian and Mexican treaties.
In all of the conditional pardon and parole cases, as in decisions
dealing with efforts by Congress to bar the lower federal courts from
entertaining constitutional challenges to certain legislative acts, the
object that the government sought to achieve was at odds with the
interests of the individuals whose rights were allegedly infringed.
This conflict engaged the whole protective thrust of the Bill of Rights.
The conflict under the prisoner exchange treaties, however, may
be different. The record establishes that the provisions in the treaties
foreclosing judicial review and presumably also the continued imprisonment requirement were insisted upon by the foreign governments."
An American refusal to accept these conditions would have frustrated
all efforts to obtain the return of the prisoners. From this it must be
assumed that the failure of the American courts to honor these provisions very likely would jeopardize the return of any prisoners who are
abroad at the time of the decision. Thus, while American governmental acquiescence in these provisions doubtless served several governmental interests,37 it was also necessary to serve the interests of the
prisoners. So long as the prisoners remained abroad, acquiescence in
the conditions exacted by the foreign governments in return for their
cooperation produced no conflict between the interests of the prisoners and those of the American government. If any conflict now exists, it is between the interests of those prisoners who have already
taken advantage of the treaty and the interests of both the prisoners
who remain abroad and the United States government. By challenging their continued imprisonment, the returned prisoners will espouse
not only their own, but also certain societal interests. To vindicate
the interests of those who have returned, however, would be to ensure
the continued suffering of those who remain abroad, many of whom
have been deprived of the same rights that the courts are being asked
to vindicate.
35. See cases cited note 32 supra.
36. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 46 (statement of Herbert J. Hansell,
Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State). If there is any doubt on this point, the case against
the treaty becomes much stronger. In this regard, it must be recognized that a grant
of complete freedom to our returned prisoners would have been a blow to our drug
enforcement program and have caused political embarrassment in other ways. See,
e.g., House Hearings (pt. I), supra note 11, at 6-8. Plainly, the government would be
loath to see some of the returned prisoners released, especially those with suspected
ties to organized crime. One of the reasons for making returnees eligible for parole was
to permit the government to deal with the cases selectively. Thus, some further showing may be required by the courts to establish to their satisfaction our government's
passive part in formulating these provisions.
37. See note 36 supra.
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Perhaps this difference is decisive. Surely it is arguable that our
problem is not whether the treaties violate the rule that prohibits
attaching unconstitutional conditions to governmental benefits, but
rather whether it is appropriate to fashion a new and quite different
rule forbidding the United States government from aiding its citizens
abroad if the price exacted by a foreign power is a relinquishment of
the citizens' rights. In the same vein, we arguably are dealing with a
very different question from that around which the historical proscription on closing all courts to habeas review may have developed.
If this be so, we cannot treat either the rule against closure of the
courts or the rule against unconstitutional conditions as controlling
without a great deal more investigation. We cannot automatically
assume that the obligation of the courts to uphold the constitutional
rights of American citizens disables the government from aiding its
citizens abroad, especially if that disability would leave those citizens
to suffer, bereft of all rights.
On the other hand, we cannot, simply by observing the harsh
consequences of these rules in our context, assume that they no longer
are determinative. Eventually, the treaty is likely to be challenged
and a court will have before it a prisoner whose rights it could vindicate. The fact that the prisoner before the court will be there only by
virtue of the treaty does not necessarily dispose of his claim. It
would be anomalous indeed if our system could imprison people
solely on the strength of foreign proceedings, without any regard for
the fairness of the proceedings, merely because it was expedient to
do so and the prisoners themselves preferred to be imprisoned here
rather than abroad. Certainly the court is still charged with guarding the interest of the whole of American society in the preservation
of our system of basic rights. The central question, in sum, is not an
easy one. It does not fit neatly within any established body of juridical principles. It subtly slips away from principles that might
otherwise be thought controlling and evokes an unsettling choice
among constitutional rights and humanitarian and governmental
interests. It forces us to think carefully about the nature and extent
of society's interest in the integrity of its institutions and values and
of our commitment to the individual and his liberties. Moreover, the
Supreme Court generally has not refused to redress constitutional
deprivations merely to avoid visiting hardships upon others similarly
situated. 8 But this propensity has met a contrary tendency in the
foreign relations context. The Court has refused to redress rights
when such redress would threaten greater hardship to others who
38. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (granting hearing to students facing
temporary suspension, despite effect on discretionary authority of school authorities);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (granting hearing prior to termination of welfare
benefits, despite effect on administration of HEW regulations).
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have suffered like deprivations but who could not bring themselves
within the jurisdiction of American courts."' These competing tendencies thus add another dimension to the search for an answer to
our problem.
In the end, we conclude that the treaty provisions foreclosing a
returned prisoner from challenging his foreign conviction are constitutionally valid. We do so without great conviction, relying in no
small part upon institutional considerations." At this juncture, however, the point of paramount interest is the convergence of our two
basic questions. The question upon which the validity of the court
closure provision turns is also the question that will determine
whether the continued sentence provision comports with the due
process clause.
As already observed, it is probable that the continued sentence
provision, no less than the court closure requirement, was part of the
price exacted by the Mexican and Canadian governments for the
release of Americans imprisoned in their countries." If so, failure to
comply with either would likely jeopardize the return of those who
remain abroad. As the bulk of this Article will demonstrate, there will
be many cases in which the continued sentence requirement can be
validated without resolving the difficult choice between the rights of
prisoners who have returned and the interests of those who remain
abroad. But in a limited number of critical cases, where defects in a
returned prisoner's foreign trial create unacceptable doubts about his
guilt, continued incarceration in an American jail would, we conclude, violate the due process clause. In such cases, therefore, the
question becomes whether that unique element that pits the values
represented by those who have returned against the values represented by those who remain abroad changes this conclusion. It is the
same question that confronts us on the court closure provisions. It
engages the same choice among constitutional rights and humanitarian and other governmental interests. It requires that we think
again and to the same extent about the nation's interest in preserving the integrity of its institutions and values and its commitment to
the individual. And, in all of this, the analysis does not change
according to whether the courts purport to address only the jurisdictional question or speak to the merits of the continued sentence
requirement as well. To say that the courts may be barred from
hearing a prisoner's constitutional claim is to conclude that no constitutional right is being impaired. To say that his continued imprisonment would violate due process is to conclude that the courts
must be open to redress the violation.
39. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
40. See text at p. 756 infra.
41. See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
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This is not to suggest, however, that the court closure provisions serve no useful purpose under our analysis. In any case where
the habeas corpus petition of a returned prisoner puts the question
of his guilt in issue, a court, upon a motion to dismiss, may be able
to avoid all inquiry into whether continued imprisonment would
violate due process. It could assume, without deciding, that a
violation might occur and proceed only to decide the jurisdictional
question. An affirmative answer would warrant dismissal of the
prisoner's petition. The important point, however, is that by predicating its judgment on jurisdictional grounds, the court would avoid
violating the treaty. Neither the Mexican nor the Canadian treaty
purports, even if it could, to deprive American courts of jurisdiction
to pass upon the validity of the jurisdiction closure provisions. And
since the treaties are not self-executing, the implementing legislation would seem to place this point beyond doubt.2 Moreover, a
judgment on jurisdictional grounds would largely avoid the embarrassments to our foreign relations that might attend a judgment on
the merits. Nevertheless, we could draw some comfort from a judgment upholding the court closure provisions. It would mean, according to our analysis, that the continued incarceration of the prisoner
would not result in a denial of his constitutional rights. Conversely,
if the unique circumstances surrounding these treaties do not suffice
to validate the court closure provisions, then, according to our analysis, all the elements necessary to find a due process deprivation will
exist. It would remain only for the court to try the factual question
of whether the requisite degree of doubt about the prisoner's guilt
3
exists.

B. THE COURSE AND MODE OF DUE PROCESS INQUIRY
As already noted, our inquiry into the constitutionality of the
continued sentence provisions proceeds through two levels. At the
first level, we ignore the unique circumstance that surrounds the
treaties and simply ask whether the continued sentence provision
might offend the due process clause. We draw a distinction between
cases where the finding of a prisoner's guilt is in question and cases
where guilt is not in doubt but the foreign court followed other practices that would offend the Constitution had the trial been conducted
42. Article VI of the Mexican treaty and article V of the Canadian treaty, see
text accompanying note 5 supra, literally purport only to foreclose the courts of receiving states from exercising jurisdiction on the merits of a challenge to a foreign conviction or sentence.
43. In adding a new section to the jurisdictional statutes on habeas corpus,
Congress saw fit only to replicate the language of the treaty articles, which speaks only
to the exercise of jurisdiction on the merits. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2256 (West Supp. 1978);
note 42 supra.
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in this country. Although a few of these latter cases are troublesome,
we basically conclude that only where guilt is in doubt does the
continued incarceration of a prisoner sufficiently threaten a violation
of due process to warrant moving to the second level of analysis,
where the unique circumstance surrounding the treaties becomes
determinative. In arriving at these conclusions, we openly engage in
a weighing of the conflicting values and interests in the various categories of cases. This is, of course, hardly a novel procedure. Far more
interesting are the justification for the weighing and the development
of a structure to guide and discipline that process. Weighing contending interests, as a mode of constitutional inquiry, has its critics. To
most, it is an open invitation for judgments reflective of nothing more
than the subjective biases of judges.4 Our discussion, in short, must
start with an inquiry into methodology.
In the end we shall argue that our method is inescapable, that it
is the only mode of analysis adequate to the intellectual demands of
our subject. 5 But before attempting to demonstrate this point, it is
useful to recall the Supreme Court's reminder that the broad generalities of the Bill of Rights, especially the due process clause, constitute the basic framework for a society committed to an "ordered
liberty."4 To say that both order and liberty contribute to the meaning of due process implies that in discerning that meaning one will
encounter both conflicting interests and a certain tension between the
values called to the aid of those interests. If one abjures ad hoc resolutions and resorts to historical principles of some generality, the interpretive task inevitably requires close attention to the social context out of which a particular dispute arises. In sum, one is clearly

44. This was precisely the point arrived at in a determination under the Portalto-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (1970), in Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co.,

168 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1948), but we do so without resort to a somewhat strained rule of
construction.
45. See Epstein, Substantive Due Process by Any Other Name: The Abortion
Cases, 1973 Sup. CT. Rxv. 159; Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment Is anAbsolute, 1961
Sup. CT. REV. 245. See generally J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Haines,
General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and Economic
Influences in the Decision of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1922); Llewellyn, A Realistic
Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 431 (1930).
The critics, of course, rarely deny entirely the need for an occasional "weighingup of social values," especially in the "open-textured" areas of the law. The criticism
is rather that such a process belongs only to the "areas of indeterminance" where the
results of a prior weighing fail to supply an answer. Their protest is, therefore, against

a too ready propensity to see legal issues in terms of conflicting values which must
continuously be reconciled. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAW 121-32 (1961). This
analysis, we suggest, rests upon a basic analytic flaw. See note 70 infra.
46. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

19781

DUE PROCESS

forewarned by the nature of the due process clause itself that the
interpretive task involves a weighing of conflicting values and interests as they emerge from their particular context. Later, we shall seek
to place this analytic mode within the larger tradition of the common
law and shall argue that it does not offend our ideas of a society
governed by principle-a society under law. 47' We shall also deal with
the alleged dangers of judicial subjectivity. For the present, however,
we turn to the conflicting elements of the problem.
Under the general heading of the claim, or as we define it, the
"principle," of order, lie a number of specific interests. These are the
government's interest in ameliorating the suffering of its citizens and
facilitating prisoner rehabilitation, its interest in curtailing the drug
traffic, its interest in assuring the humane treatment of American
citizens, thereby reducing one irritant in our relations with Mexico
in particular,48 and its interest in testing and perfecting treaties of
this kind as a general device for protecting Americans who travel
abroad. Quite apart from the more specific humanitarian and other
values that lend urgency to these objectives, they are all supported
by the more general value assigned to effective governance: the assumption of a democratic society that, absent official corruption,
society as a whole will gain from the successful pursuit of any goal
set by its elected representatives.
When the Mexican treaty is placed in a broader political context,
these governmental objectives assume an urgency that no mere catalogue can adequately convey. Mexico is our nearest Latin American
neighbor. It is the developing nation with which the United States
has historically had its closest ties. Mexico's population growth rate
is one of the highest in the world. 9 The tensions generated by this
growth, exacerbated by the historical social and economic cleavages
within Mexican society and by Mexico's proximity to the affluence
of the United States and the resulting efforts of many poor Mexicans
to enter this country, render the matter of maintaining good relations
with Mexico one of the most delicate and difficult problems confront47. In a rather eloquent variation on a theme by Justice Holmes, Justice Frankfurter noted that as the "very antithesis of a Procrustean rule," judicial enforcement
of the due process clause was one of the most striking manifestations of how "the whole
law" "'depends upon differences of degree . . . as soon as it is civilized.'" Irvine v.
California, 347 U.S. 128, 143 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting LeRoy Fibre
Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 232 U.S. 340, 354 (1914) (Holmes, J., concurring)).
To this Frankfurter added, again quoting Holmes, "Between the differences of degree
which that inherently undefinable concept entails 'and the simple universality of the
rules of the Twelve Tables, or the Leges Barbarorum, there lies the culture of two
thousand years."' Id.
48. See Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 55-56 (statement of Peter Benzinger,
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice).
49. See Survey of Mexico, THE ECONoMisT, April 22, 1978, at 75.
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ing contemporary American diplomacy. Elimination of the irritant to
that relationship engendered by these prisoner cases and their association with our drug control program is a task of no small importance, as urgent perhaps as any like effort anywhere else in the world.
Further bolstering these concerns are two sets of internationally
determined interests. The first of these is reflected in the jurisdictionselecting precepts of international law, which the Supreme Court has
recognized in several decisions upholding the validity of extradition
and Status of Forces agreementsS-agreements which are, in many
respects, similar to the Mexican and Canadian treaties. 5' These precepts seek to promote a mutually beneficial intercourse between otherwise diverse, independent, and often jealous nations. They accord
to each nation a large measure of freedom to define what acts within
its territory are criminal and to prescribe the modes for prosecuting
and punishing those who engage in such acts.5 2 They impose on the
judicial institutions of all other nations a duty to accord a large
measure of respect to the judgments of courts within the nation where
the acts were committed. As the Supreme Court has made clear, they
establish that the Constitution can indeed have a different impact
when a foreign, rather than domestic, proceeding is the focal point
of a challenge in an American court. 3 As a corollary, they also tend
to legitimize both the sensibilities and any consequent retaliation
that a foreign government might exhibit if an American court refused
to respect its judgments in cases where it had jurisdiction.
In addition to these jurisdictional principles, there is the even
more commanding precept that all nations, in order to promote a
more viable international order and secure good relations with other
states, should fulfill their solemn international agreements. 4 No
American court can lose sight of the fact that a judgment invalidating
either the Canadian or Mexican treaty will compel the United States
to breach its international obligations, thereby violating international law.
50. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109
(1901).
51. Compare Mexican Treaty, supra note 1, and Canadian Treaty, supranote 2,
with Status of Forces Agreement, July 9, 1966, United States-Republic of Korea, art.
XXII, para. (7)(b), 17 U.S.T. 1677, 1697, T.I.A.S. No. 6127 ("sympathetic consideration" to be givdn to United States request for custody of United States citizens convicted by Korean court). See also Note, supra note 14, at 1501 n.12.
52. See, e.g., Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) ("A Sovereign nation has

exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,
unless it expressly consents to surrender its jurisdiction.").
53. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109
(1901).
54. See generally Senate Hearings,supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Herbert J.
Hansell, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State).
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Although the interests so far enumerated seem to establish a
strong case for validating the Mexican and Canadian treaties, these
interests standing alone yield an inaccurate picture of the problem.
One must consider the Constitution, which embodies a concern that
surely stands near the apex in our hierarchy of political values: our
abhorrence of any official deprivation of human liberty carried out
through procedures that are not fundamentally fair or decent, even
if the deprivation serves an otherwise proper public purpose. This
abhorrence supplies the core of the case against the treaties. But to
describe that core is not enough; there still remains the task of placing it within a total perspective on our problem.
First, it must be remembered that the Constitution not only
protects individuals caught in the toils of official action, but also
warns all officials that any attempt to use power arbitrarily, however
well-intentioned or humane the goal, may not succeed. There is, in
other words, an essential prophylactic constitution. And yet the integrity of that constitution-the credibility of its warning-is plainly
dependent upon the vigor with which constitutional values are enforced in particular cases. Each case forms part of a pattern, and it
is the pattern that defines how and to what extent that case will
affect the content of the prophylactic constitution. There is, in short,
an inextricable relationship between each returned prisoner's case
and the larger societal concern for the values at issue in any one case.
This relationship underscores a rudimentary point that some
commentators seem to have forgotten. While it is true that the
Constitution speaks to American but not foreign officials, it does not
necessarily follow that the Constitution is inapplicable because a
foreign rather than an American court deprived the prisoners of their
liberty in the first instance. But for the decision of an American court
to uphold the treaty and the decision of the executive to carry it out,
the returned prisoner would go free. At a technical level, the American government is implicated in an act of deprivation even though
that deprivation was initiated by foreign authority. At a less technical level, it would surely be anomalous if "fairness and decency" in
a foreign proceeding were a matter of constitutional indifference
an American citizen solely on the
when American officials imprisoned
55
proceeding.
that
of
strength
Second, it is necessary to define more carefully the precise humanitarian interests at stake at this level of the analysis. Here we are
55. Perhaps we then would face a situation similar to that below:
"For instance now," [the Queen] went on

. .

. "there's the King's Messen-

ger. He's in prison now, being punished: and the trial doesn't even begin till
next Wednesday: and of course the crime comes last of all."
"Suppose he never commits the crime?" said Alice.
"That would be all the better, wouldn't it." The Queen said ....
C. DODrSON, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLAss AND WHAT ALIcE FOUND THERE, in THE
CoMmrE WORKS oF LEws CARROLL 226-27 (Modern Library ed. 1936).
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not concerned with effects on those prisoners who remain abroad;
that is an appropriate matter for consideration only at the second
level of analysis. Moreover, the decisions upon which we must rely
for guidance typically involve situations where a continuous conflict
exists between the government and the individual. 6 They do not
address the unique problem of the individual who, having left a class
whose interests the government seeks to serve, asserts a constitutional claim injurious to those who remain in that class. To assay
accurately the lesson of these cases, therefore, we must exclude at this
point all concern for the other prisoners. This also means that, at this,
level of analysis, the humanitarian objects of the government, though,
not trivial, become far less weighty. Yet those objects are not without
some effect. The returned prisoner is in a position to advance his
constitutional claim only because he has been the beneficiary of a'
humanitarian measure for which his continued imprisonment was the'
price paid. But it is constitutional rights with which we are concerned. It is doubtful that we could ever justify depriving a person of
his rights merely because his insistence upon those rights appears to
be an act of ingratitude. At most, the prisoner's exploitation of this
humanitarian effort serves to ameliorate somewhat the threat that
denial of his constitutional claim might otherwise pose to the integrity of our values and institutions.
Third, even if under decisions of the Supreme Court,57 we must
assign a high order of urgency to the interests served by respecting
the Mexican and Canadian claims to primary jurisdiction in these
prisoner cases, this is not quite the whole of the matter. The
jurisdiction-selecting precepts of international law to which the Court
has made reference do not supply a wholly accurate lens through
which to view the international community's perspective on our problem.
Under emerging international norms, a nation with a claim to
primary jurisdiction is not wholly free to do as it sees fit in the administration of criminal justice within its territory. Both Mexico and
Canada have pledged themselves, under the United Nations Charter,
to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.55
Mexico signed a similar pledge in the Charter of the Organization of
American States," and it also adhered to the American Declaration
56. See Parts I & MI infra.
57. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109
(1901).
58. The United Nations Charter provides that among the purposes of the United
Nations, "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion" is of paramount importance. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
59. Apr. 30, 1948, [1951] 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
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of the Rights and Duties of Man, which calls for securing to all persons certain fundamental procedural rights." Although no official
charge has been advanced against Mexico or Canada under these
several documents, or any of the prescribed remedial procedures invoked, they can hardly be ignored. Surely, upon a showing of probable violation, an American court must take these principles into account if it is also being asked to honor the more traditional jurisdictional precepts of international law.
In addition, the claim to primary jurisdiction must not obscure
yet another set of internationally determined principles of no less
ancient lineage. It has long been axiomatic that no nation's courts are
required by international comity or law to recognize, much less execute, foreign judgments abhorrent to their own fundamental principles.6' This rule is, of course, riddled with ambiguity and the potential for abuse. We need not, however, engage the subtle question of
its proper scope. The salient point is that, notwithstanding the apparent services to good international order that the traditional jurisdictional rules might be thought to advance, the international community itself has long recognized the need for some, and perhaps
considerable, national autonomy or freedom.6" The international
community has acknowledged that nations perforce will not compromise too far with what they consider fundamental. Presumably, it has
also acknowledged that to ask for such compromise would only undermine the orderliness that the jurisdictional precepts seek to promote.
Whatever the rationale, it is abundantly plain that, but for the treaties, the American courts would stand foursquare upon a venerable
international tradition in subjecting Mexican and Canadian judgments to constitutional scrutiny. The treaties doubtless change the
situation; they endow the jurisdictional rules with more significance
than they might otherwise merit." Yet it also seems plain that those
rules are not a complete or categorical expression of what the international community might expect of the United States.
In sum, our problem is one of many dimensions. To ignore any
No. 3263, NINTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
260-65 (1948).
61. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex.
522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915); cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 106, 120 N.E.
198, 200 (1918) ("A tort committed in one state creates a right of action that may be
sued upon in another unless public policy forbids.").
60. See U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE PuB.

OF AMERICAN STATES

62. See generally J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLucr OF LAWS §§ 29-43 (5th
ed. Boston 1857) (lst ed. Boston 1834); Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse:
Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and InternationalLaw, 65 YAE L.J.
1087 (1956); Yntema, The Comity Doctrine,65 MICH. L. Rav. 9 (1966).
63. Cf. Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957) (jurisdictional question over American soldier arguably acting "in performance of official duty").
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of these dimensions is, as with any other human problem, to invite
irrationality. All must be accommodated, however difficult that may
be. Thus, the Constitution is engaged, and the rules governing the
international community do not, according to their own terms, claim
to foreclose application of the Constitution. Yet to say that a foreign
judgment is not invariably entitled to respect does not prescribe the
respect to which it is entitled. Certainly it does not define the
measure of respect warranted by the substantial number of interests
that the exercise of such respect would serve.
In order to take that measure, we must, because we deal with
constitutional values, begin by recognizing that too great a compromise of those values can tear at the fabric of our society. We must
also acknowledge that, in. assessing the magnitude of any proposed
compromise, each individual case will become a part of the pattern
that defines the content of the Constitution as bulwark protecting us
all. Yet we must also acknowledge that some cases do not present that
potential, that situations can have a uniqueness that insulates compromise from endangering the social fabric. Also, we must know that
without compromise we may risk an even greater threat to our freedom. Our abhorrence of arbitrary power is not a sentiment of constant intensity separate from the natural fears and sensibilities that
a particular case may evoke. To endow that abhorrence with a categorical quality that brooks no compromise, when to do so also threatens great national objects, is to construct a fragile regime indeed. At
the point where compromise is trivial when measured against the
objects that it would serve, a refusal to compromise can discredit the
underlying value itself. The preservation of liberty is, in sum, a very
delicate thing, since it must at times threaten our need for order.
Precisely because it is delicate, it calls for an intellectual exercise in
balancing. It serves no purpose to deny this. To hide it under the
pretense that there is a categorical quality to the commands of the
due process clause denigrates what should be celebrated. It misleads
not only our judges, but also ourselves into thinking that wise judging
is only a matter of technical mastery when, on the contrary, it is a
high art that calls for a subtle mixture of broad vision and pragmatic
good sense.
C.

THE DISCIPLINE OF JuDIcIAL BALANCING

To speak of wise judging as an art requiring vision and good sense
is to speak of a highly personal, if not subjective, undertaking. It also
serves to introduce the singular and continuously fascinating problem
of assuring that our judicial system not only exhibits a humane and
dynamic quality-a quality of cultural and moral perceptiveness-but also that it is reasonably predictable, protected against
personal caprice, and capable of drawing to its judgments the author-
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ity of established ways and traditional values. Plainly, this is not the
place to explore much of this problem. Nevertheless, in light of the
criticisms of our suggested mode of analysis," we must affirm our
conviction that it is not only compatible with such a system but an
inextricable part of that system.
In a broad sense it is both useful and, properly understood, accurate to say that, at its best, the working of our system is rooted in
both the reasoned use of principles and certain traditional emanations from the separation of powers doctrine. If this is so, it is also
useful to begin this discussion with the taxonomy of a principle: to
think of a principle as exhibiting several characteristics. In simple
descriptive terms, a principle is a statement that identifies the judicial outcome to be associated with a specified set of facts. Working
within this definition, as part of its implicit content, however, is a
normative dimension derived from a subtle interplay of consequences
and values. Consequences speak to the concrete case that arguably
falls within the specified factual setting. A concern for consequences
compels inquiry as to who and what would gain and who and what
would suffer if the specified outcome were actually applied, and for
how many and how long the perceived consequences would persist.
This is the empirical element that bears on the normative. But
plainly this is not enough. There also are values-the ethical factors
derived from our whole culture and especially our history-that fix
the normative weight or urgency of assuring or avoiding the perceived
consequences of a specified outcome. Stated another way, principles
have a normative dimension derived from values. But those values
do not exist in abstraction. They speak with greater or lesser insistence only as the consequences of applying the principle are appraised. Consequences, in turn, are normatively neutral until informed by some ethical postulate.
All of this leads to a further characteristic of a principle. As a
purely descriptive statement, a principle comes to the concrete case
only as a possible determinant of the result; it is a statement of
tendency, not sufficiency." Only as it is seen in its application to
the particulars of a case can one conclude that it should control.
But if all principles are only statements of tendency and must await
particularization, then to conclude that a, stated principle should
control also involves a prior conclusion, whether articulated or not,
that no established contrary principle, or no contrary principle that
might be devised given the concrete implications of established principles, speaks with greater normative weight or urgency. To ignore
the more compelling contrary principle or to refuse to devise a new,
64. See note 45 supra.
65. See generally R. DWoRKiN, TAKiNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 26 (1977).
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more urgent principle is, in effect, to decide without regard to principle. At the heart of the reasoned use of principles, in other words, lies
the intellectual task of balancing. Inextricably involved in that process is an identification and comparison of the affected interests in a
given case. Interests, both private and collective, as defined by existing social policies" are the essential terms of reference for identifying
what is a loss and what is a gain and who and what stands to gain or
lose. They are the essential tools for ascertaining consequences.
Against this background we move to the next facet of the process.
No judge is entirely free to assay a balance anew each time he is
asked. He must start from established principles embodied in authoritative materials. 7 He is constrained to move from that point to
his case according to the traditional and oft-explored process of analogical reasoning that is the common law method." Although others
have explored this process in ways to which we cannot add," we need
only observe-and this becomes critical to our use of the cases-that
at the heart of that form of reasoning is, again, the balancing of which
we speak. Stated another way, how does the judge know that a prior
case involves a problem close enough to his own to warrant emulation
of the prior solution, unless he looks to the different consequences
that the prior solution would yield and assays whether those differences, weighed against the contrary principles available or that might
be devised, warrant following the prior solution?
This process is transparent when there is a cognizable choice to
be made between competing lines of authority. But the situation in
which there is competing authority differs only in degree from what
might be termed the wholly "provided-for case.""0 How can such a
66. Social policies are a complex phenomenon. Descriptively, they consist of
statements of desired outcomes associated with particular situations. As pure description, however, they are normatively neutral. Their normative content is dependent
upon some underlying ethical postulate or value that may be more or less clearly
expressed by the policymaker, whether legislative, executive, or judicial. This means
that when a case thought to engage a particular social policy is decided, the policy
functions in the nature of a principle. In this respect, it breeds confusion to suggest
that principles derive only from courts and constitutions and not through the political
process. On the other hand, social policies also function in our design in a more modest
way. They represent one device for identifying the interests at stake in a case, thereby
playing a critical analytic role in the ascertainment of the consequences of contending
principles.
67. We include at this point all authoritative statements of principles, whether
constitutional, legislative, judicial, or, within its areas of competence, executive. See
note 66 supra.

68. See, e.g., E.

LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO

LEGAL REASONING (1948); Goodhart,

Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930).
69. See, e.g., B. CARDoZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); K. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION (1960).
70. We have reversed H.L.A. Hart's phrase "the unprovided-for-case." See gen-
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designation be applied to a case without first ascertaining whether
variant facts warrant variant results according to a new "weighingup" of contending principles? Possibly, of course, the factual variants
may be so modest and irrelevant that we intuitively know that the
prior decision controls without elaborating upon the balance.71 Possierally H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 121-32. Hart uses this category in acknowledging
that there may be occasions when a case falls within an "area of indeterminance"
where a new "weighing-up of social values" becomes necessary. This, he suggests, is
most likely to occur in the "open-textured" areas of the law. The point, however, is
that to Hart this is a highly exceptional phenomenon; law is principally rules, which
invite no such decisional mode. See note 71 infra. Hart's concept is a protest against
a too ready propensity to see legal questions in terms of conflicting principles that must
be continuously reconciled. This we view as a fundamental flaw. How does one know
whether any case is or is not within an area of indeterminance? For example, in our
case, the prisoners argue that their case is well within established constitutional principles. An American court, having the opportunity to free a prisoner, cannot, they
assert, deliberately decide to imprison him on the strength of a conviction obtained
without adherence to the basic safeguards of the Constitution.
The question, therefore, is by what license we suggest that our case may be the
exception: that the prisoner's principle is not sufficient for our decision but supplies
only some, and not all, of the elements we must consider. The answer begins with the
observation that the conviction was issued by a foreign court in a case over which that
court, according to the rules of the international community, had jurisdiction. For this
and other reasons, we can anticipate that there will be adverse consequences for the
United States and other American citizens imprisoned abroad if our courts refuse to
honor the foreign conviction. But this is mere observation and does not explain why
these observations temper the prisoner's principle. To that end, we must recall that
the United States lives within a community that, under certain circumstances, can
only be preserved if we apply our basic values differentially when they impact upon
other nations. To suggest that this fact moves our case out from established principle
into an area of indeterminance means that we have already weighed the United States'
stake in the international community against the values on which the prisoner's principle is based and found that stake sufficient to bar any automatic application of
the prisoner's principle. The very task of deciding whether we should reach a new
weighing-up of social values involves, in other words, a weighing-up of the same values.
The process is inevitable and continuous. It goes to the very heart of legal reasoning
and cannot be confined but only disciplined.
71. This is the only instance when one can talk about law as rules and define a
rule, distinct from a principle, as a statement of outcomes that, without more, is
required to be followed in any case that falls within its specified facts. See R. DwoRM,
supra note 65, at 26; H.L.A. HART, supra note 45, at 121-32. If by definition a rule is
not a mere statement of tendency, but of sufficiency that commands a result, then by
definition there can be no such thing as a rule until one has decided that the rule
applies. But how does one reach that conclusion, especially if there is a contending
statement or interpretation, without the balancing of which we speak? To engage in
such balancing is to affirm that there is no rule, but only a statement of tendency.
Thus, to talk of rules as distinct from principles is, strictly speaking, meaningless. In
pragmatic terms, however, one can think of a case as being governed by a rule, as a
statement of sufficiency, where intuitively the factual variants are so trivial or irrelevant that it becomes efficient not to consider the balance. Plainly, this encompasses a
rather modest category of legal problems.
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bly we can then speak of the wholly "provided-for case." But such a
mode of speech is a convention that only brings a certain efficiency
to the system; it should not be allowed to obscure the process itself.
At this point, of course, we encounter the .subtle question of how
far constitutional adjudication is to be removed, if at all, from the
constraints of stare decisis,7" assuming one could locate within the
72. Here we need only reference the views of Justice Douglas stated in his Cardozo lecture before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York:
I do not suggest that stare decisis is so fragile a thing as to bow before
every wind. The law is not properly susceptible to whim or caprice. It must
have the sturdy qualities of every framework that is designed for substantial
structures. Moreover, it must have uniformity when applied to the daily
affairs of men.
Uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to many activities. If
they are not present, the integrity of contracts, wills, conveyances and securities is impaired. . . . And there will be no equal justice under law if a
negligence rule is applied in the morning but not in the afternoon ....
It is easy, however, to overemphasize stare decisis as a principle in the
lives of men. Even for the experts law is only a prediction of what judges will
do under a given set of facts-a prediction that makes rules of law and
decisions not logical deductions but functions of human behavior ....
The place of stare decisis in constitutional law is even more tenuous. A
judge looking at a constitutional decision may have compulsions to revere
past history and accept what was once written. But he remembers above all
else that it is the Constitution which he swore to support and defend, not
the gloss which his predecessors may have put on it. So he comes to formulate his own views, rejecting some earlier ones as false and embracing others.
He cannot do otherwise unless he lets men long dead and unaware of the
problems of the age in which he lives do his thinking for him.
This reexamination of precedent in constitutional law is a personal matter for each judge who comes along. When only one new judge is appointed
during a short period, the unsettling effect in constitutional law may not be
great. But when a majority of a Court is suddenly reconstituted, there is
likely to be substantial unsettlement. There will be unsettlement until the
new judges have taken their positions on constitutional doctrine. During that
time-which may extend a decade or more-constitutional law will be in
flux. That is the necessary consequence of our system and to my mind a
healthy one. The alternative is to let the Constitution freeze in the pattern
which one generation gave it. But the Constitution was designed for the
vicissitudes of time. It must never become a code which carries the overtones
of one period that may be hostile to another.
So far as constitutional law is concerned stare decisis must give way
before the dynamic component of history. Once it does, the cycle starts
again.
Douglas, Stare Decisis, 4 REcoRD 152, 152-54 (1949) (citations and footnotes omitted).
There is, of course, something appealing in all of this. There is a vision of the
dynamic quality of our Constitution, a document "designed for the vicissitudes of
time." It also may be thought to ring true as evidenced by our tendency to anticipate
major changes in doctrine with each major reconstitution in the personnel of the
Supreme Court and by our propensity to think in terms of the "Warren Court" or the
"Burger Court." But in the end, if somehow Justice Douglas speaks true, we would
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traditions of the common law some norm for the practice of that
doctrine.7" We need not, however, address that question. We have a
wealth of judicial precedent' iiistructive at the initial level of our
analysis. Our use of those precedents lies well within the bounds of a
traditional, even rigorous, adherence to their teachings. At the same
not celebrate his truth. In addressing our immediate problem we stay clear of attempting to predict what the courts will do, not because that is uninteresting, but rather
because we are concerned with what the courts ought to do. In formulating that answer
there is much in Justice Douglas' conception of constitutional litigation that is quite
disturbing. At bottom he seems to say that a judge must give his fundamental loyalty
to his own, wholly personal, set of doctrinal convictions, in the formulation of which
history teaches no more than that which he personally finds persuasive. Also, he
trivializes stare decisis; it serves only to lend predictability to private relationships
and avoid judicial caprice. That he gives as examples of where stare decisis serves a
purpose only the law dealing with private relationships ignores the whole legitimizing function of precedent in constitutional decisionmaking. Moreover, stare decisis
serves not merely the negative function of guarding against personal caprice. It seems
affirmatively to secure to constitutional decisionmaking the larger truth, learned at
great expense, that generally more wisdom lies in the cumulative experience of a
people than in the partial visions of one man, however well-endowed intellectually or
morally he might be. History weighs upon a judge far more insistently than is indicated
by his own appraisal of its wisdom. In sum, our view of the matter comes much closer
to the spirit of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943):
One who belongs to the most vilified and persecuted minority in history
is not likely to be insensible to the freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution.
Were my purely personal attitude relevant I should wholeheartedly associate
myself with the general libertarian views in the Court's opinion, representing
as they do the thought and action of a lifetime. But as judges we are neither
Jew nor Gentile, neither Catholic nor agnostic ....
As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private
notions of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish
them or how mischievous I may deem their disregard.
Accord, Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). If
we cannot always have great judges, surely we cannot ignore great judging in articulating the mode by which judgments should be made.
73. We must her acknowledge Professor Wechsler's well-noted appeal for "neutral principles" in constitutional adjudication as essentially another line of attack
upon the use of the common law method in constitutional litigation. See H. WECHSLR,
Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, in PmNcnLas, PoLMCS, AND FUNDAMmmrAL LAW 3 (1961). It is, however, an attack that comes from a direction diametrically opposed to that of Justice Douglas. See note 72 supra. While explicitly an objection to intruding the ad hoe modes of political decisionmaking into the principled
processes of the Court, Professor Wechsler ends up, we suggest, rejecting the intrusion
of much of the common law tradition as well. Wechsler's objection is echoed in Justice
Black's insistence that the case-by-case method of common law adjudication-Justice
Holmes' emphasis on experience rather than logic-poses an unwarranted danger of
intruding personal discretion into constitutional decisionmaking. See Linkletter v.
Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 642 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). For a fuller development of
this view and a broader analysis of Professor Wechsler's essay, see Deutsch, Neutrality,
Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some IntersectionsBetween Law and Political
Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968).
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time, and within those traditional boundaries, the definitive purport
of a precedent cannot be gleaned from a narrow comparison of particular factual elements devoid of reference to historical context.
Those boundaries not only permit but insist that we draw upon a
total sense of the balance struck by the court in dealing with the prior
case, that we attempt to capture the actual perception of consequences and felt intensity of values. And when we come to formulating the lessons of that experience for our problem, we do not, indeed
cannot, ignore what refinement of perception and reordering of values
time may have wrought. 4
This point introduces yet another constraint upon our judicial
system: the tradition that the judge should provide an adequate rationalization or explanation for his results. This tradition is not always carried out with facility, but it works as a constraint upon the
rational processes of the decisionmaker, especially since it is used in
evaluating his work. Moreover, depending upon its persuasiveness, it
has much to do with lending authoritativeness to the results.75 With
wide variations in the skill of the decisionmaker and the perceived
need, the process of rationalization begins with a particularization of
the factual elements and the resulting mix of consequences and
values that explain established principles in the context of decided
cases. It includes a like particularization of the case at hand, structured in the nature of an experiment according to the differences
that application of the established principles, as explained, would
yield if applied. Of most importance, the process includes an articulation of the reasons for the choice made. This is the point where
vision and good sense must work. But it is also the point where vision
and good sense are largely judged by the persuasiveness of the stated
reasons for the choice. Therein lies the basis for a major indictment
74.

See generally K.

LLEWELLYN,

On the CurrentRecapture of the GrandTradi-

tion, in JURISPRUDENCE 215 (1962).
75. See generally, K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 69.
76. Within this general requirement, and as a particularly important application
of it, some of the cases that we review illustrate the special problem of assessing
whether any particular governmental action is sufficiently important to the service of
a governmental interest to warrant measuring the consequences of invalidating that
action by reference to the consequences of frustrating the government's asserted interest. The interests can be readily identified and the consequences of frustrating those
interests can be assayed in the manner to which we have alluded.
Before reaching that point, however, there is the question whether the particular
action is an essential means toward achieving the asserted end, or interest. While
broadly this problem is one of rational efficacy, means and ends are not always readily
separable. Means blend into ends in a way that suggests a continuum, any point on
which is to be fixed through the interaction of a number of judgmental elements.
Initially there is an intrinsic element. Assuming no alternatives, what is the incremental impact of a particular act in securing attainment of the larger end; how "essential"
is it? Next, what is that incremental value when compared with the practicable and
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of those positivists who, by emphasizing the place of rules in the law,"
minimize the element of judicial choice. Their theory tends to excuse,
and even to praise, the purely conclusional form of appellate opinion
writing that serves only to undermine the respect and authoritativeness of the court."8
Finally, as the case to be decided moves away from either the
relatively certain parameters of established principles or such new
principles as can be grounded on a readily discernible value consensus in the society, a further constraint on the judicial system may be
found in certain institutional considerations emanating from the separation of powers doctrine. Again we cannot undertake to canvass the
whole subtle matter of judicial restraint, but, as we move into the
second level of our analysis, it is important to acknowledge that in
constitutional litigation, where the choice before a court has already
been assayed by the political departments of government, there may
come a point when the choice must stand and receive judicial blessing. The point is not always easily discernible and can rarely be
explained by reference to vague notions of judicial deference. Generally, however, the point where the political choice must remain the
definitive choice should be determined by the degree of uncertainty
that the judiciary, in candor, would have to concede attaches to its
own choice. This in turn depends upon two factors. First, the judge
must ascertain the apparent distance of the case from a body of
extant legal principles, measured by the balancing mode. The greater
the distance, the more value-neutral the political decision and the
more uncertain the projected judicial choice. But value neutrality is
not enough. It is also necessary to consider the complex social, politilawful alternatives that are available? There is also a concern for certainty. The less
certain a court's perception of the margin of a particular act's "essentiality," the more
nearly its decision must be treated as engaging the larger objectives of that act directly.
Finally, judgment will be affected by the inherent momentousness of those objectives.
The larger the interests at stake in the policies the government is said to be pursuing,
the more certain a court must be about these marginal assessments.
77. See note 71 supra.
78. As a vivid, but unhappy, illustration of this point, one need only review the
efforts of the Florida appellate courts in dealing with the state's Administrative Procedure Act, enacted in 1974. See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52-.73 (1975). The courts' opinions

suffer from a lack of clarity and guidance and the consequent loss of authoritativeness.
See Department of Revenue v. Amrep Corp., 358 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1978); Hill v. School
Bd., 351 So. 2d 732 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Department of Transp. v. Morehouse,
350 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Department of Health & Rehabilitative Serv.
v. Artis, 345 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Department of Administration v.
Stevens, 344 So. 2d 290 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The point is even more vividly

illustrated if one then contrasts the few opinions where there is a serious effort at
rational and careful explanation of the choices made. See, e.g., School Bd. v. Mitchell,
346 So. 2d 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); State ex rel.Dep't of Gen. Serv. v. Willis,
344 So. 2d 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
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cal, and economic realities that determine the consequences of any
decision, political or judicial. In this context, uncertainty may be
measured by the degree to which those realities will not yield to any
stable or tested body of predictive theory. Once again, the greater the
uncertainty, the stronger the case for allowing the political choice to
stand.
Against this all too brief structural design of the judicial system,
one must turn to the criticism that a balancing mode too often invites
decisions based upon nothing more than the subjective biases of
judges. 9 The charge is many-faceted. If, as we have suggested, a
balancing process is essential to rationality in the sense of a decision
based upon the whole view of a problem, the charge is tantamount
to saying that rationality can only be purchased at the expense of
principle. This, we argue, is patently untrue. Balancing is at the heart
of the reasoned use of principle, and thus the charge is actually directed at other targets.
One can readily acknowledge that a particular judge may, under
the guise of weighing the interests at stake in a case, ignore the
lessons of established principles or fail to explain adequately his refusal to follow those lessons. But if this is an unwarranted intrusion
of subjective judicial bias into a case, it is not the fault of the mode
of decision. It is simply an unprincipled decision. Likewise, subjectivity in a judge may stem from a failure to undertake the painstaking yet essential task of deriving guidance from prior judicial experience in ways that extend beyond finding a rule sufficient to the case:
a failure to find guidance in principles. Again, this is not an indictment of judicial balancing but only a charge that the judge, by falling
to practice his art skillfully, has produced an unprincipled decision.
Finally, the charge may serve only to mask more subtle propensities.
Particularly with reference to constitutional litigation, it may stem
from a disagreement with the result because that result fails to conform to some purported categorical command of the Bill of Rights.
If, however, we are correct in suggesting that weighing is essential to
rationality and a basic attribute of our system, .one is very likely to
find that the search for such a categorical reference, coupled with
the denial of efficacy of our mode, only disguises a sub silentio
weighing or an a priori determination by which one set of values or
another has already been treated as controlling. 0
79. See note 45 supra.
80. Professor Epstein's examination of the 1973 abortion decisions illustrates the

ease with which the critics can disavow, and even attack, the balancing of interests in
constitutional litigation precisely as they proceed to use the same method. See Epstein,
supra note 45. After a telling demonstration that in its balancing of the interests of
the mother, the unborn child, and the state, the Supreme Court could evoke no princi-
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In the end, of course, subjectivity is not the issue. The strength
of our system lies in its insistence upon subjective qualities that are
the wherewithal of bias: ethical and cultural perceptiveness, humaneness, a willingness to innovate, to assure a dynamic quality to
our law, and, in the reasoned use of principles, a capacity to discern
the whole sense of what has gone before. In sum, the problem lies not
with judicial exercise of subjective bias but with a refusal to call upon
bias only when and as the constraints of the system permit.
II. THE PRISONERS' CLAIMS
A. THE ESSENTIAL BENCHMARKS
Working at the initial level of our due process analysis, and in
accord with our balancing mode, we turn to a development of the
benchmarks that cause us to distinguish between cases where a returned prisoner's guilt isin doubt and cases exhibiting other defects.
It is this categorization that, when weighed against the governmental
interests" involved in the prisoner exchange8 2treaties, serves radically
to narrow the area of constitutional doubt.
We start with an instructive series of foreign arrest cases in the
ples-no "adequate definition of a person"-or perceived value consensus-no "theory
of life"-to support the conclusions it reached, the author concludes that Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), are symptomatic of the
"analytic poverty possible in constitutional litigation." His conclusion is that "we
must criticize . . . the entire method of constitutional interpretation that allows the
Supreme Court in the name of Due Process both to define and balance interests on
the major social and political issues of our time." Epstein, supranote 45, at 185.
As an alternative, Professor Epstein suggests that once the Court has "fabored to
insure that the political process will be as open and fair as the inexact act of government will permit," id., it can properly refuse to intrude upon legislative judgments.
He avers that the state laws in question were not "monuments to the ignorance of
man." Id. They were only "uneasy but reasonable responses to most troublesome
questions." Id.
How extraordinary! How does the author know that the state laws in question were
not "monuments to the ignorance of man"? The answer, if one traces his argument, is
clear. He carefully, and with telling effect, examines the interests of the mother, the
unborn child, and the state and finds no compelling reason to say that any one outweighs the others. What standards or criteria does he employ in reaching these
conclusions? He finds an absence of any judicial experience or clearly identifiable
social value consensus to support one set of competing interests or another. In so doing,
he engages in the very social weigh-up that he otherwise decries. Nor does he offer the
wherewithal for avoiding the balancing of interests. He succeeds only in delineating
standards to govern that process-standards discoverable only by the process itself. In
the end, of course, he confesses the analytic folly of his own criticism by resorting to a
wholly separate disciplinary principle: the need for a sensibility to the limited province
of courts in the larger scheme of governance-the principle of judicial restraint.
81. See Part fI infra.
82. See Part IV infra.
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Second Circuit. In United States v. Toscanino,O it was held that the
narcotics conviction of a defendant fairly tried upon a regular grand
jury indictment would be overturned if he could prove that he had
been kidnapped by American narcotics agents and Uruguayan officials acting as paid agents of the United States, that he had been held
and tortured for about three weeks, and that he had been forcibly
returned to the United States where he was arrested. In his opinion,
Judge Mansfield acknowledged that the court was departing from the
Ker-Frisbie rule, 84 under which a valid conviction would not be
overturned under the due process clause merely because the defendant was brought within the jurisdiction of an American court by
illegal means." He nevertheless purported to find in the decisions
since Frisbie v. Collins 6 a heightened sensitivity to the rights of the
accused and a concern for the integrity of our institutions that warranted some mitigation of that rule."7 The judge first quoted Justice
Frankfurter's assertion in Rochin v. California" that the courts had
an inescapable duty to "'."exercise . . .judgment upon the whole
course of the proceedings"'" to ascertain their conformity with our
basic "'"canons of decency and fairness."' "8s9 Having thus defined
the scope of judicial scrutiny, he invoked Justice Brandeis' dissent in
0 pretrial exercises
Olmstead v. United States:"
of arbitrary power
83. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
84. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
85. If the Toscanino decision was a departure from what was perceived as the
broad rule of Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), it was arguably very much in keeping
with the underlying mode and sensibilities of that decision. In Ker, the Court did, in
fact, acknowledge that the manner of arrest outside the jurisdiction of the trial court
could engage the due process clause. See id. at 440. The defendant had been regularly
indicted by a grand jury, a warrant had been issued for his arrest, and a request for
his extradition from Peru had been issued. See id. at 440-41. This was wholly different,
the Court carefully pointed out, from the case of an arrest without warrant or other
finding of probable cause by a proper officer. See id. at 440. In the latter case, the due
process question would be far more difficult. As it was, the kidnapping in Ker was
brought about because the effort at extradition had been frustrated; the Court viewed
the kidnapping as a "mere irregularity," which, when weighed against the fact that
the defendant had been fairly tried, was not a sufficient ground for overturning his
conviction. See id. Unfortunately, this careful approach was totally ignored in Frisbie
v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), where the challenge to the arrest was summarily
dismissed on the authority of Ker.
86. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
87. In support of this proposition, Judge Mansfield discussed the purported
"constitutional revolution" in criminal procedure that had expanded the interpretation of the concept of due process. See 500 F.2d at 272-73.
88. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
89. 500 F.2d at 273 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1944) (separate opinion of Frankfurter,
J.))).
90. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).

1978]

DUE PROCESS

might indeed require aborting the results of an otherwise unexceptional proceeding" 'in order to maintain respect for law; in order to
promote confidence in the administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial process from contamination.' "" In light of these
principles, the arrest in Toscanino, which was not only brutal but
violative both of our treaties and of international law, could not be
92
allowed to stand.
There are two basic differences between Toscanino and the returned prisoners' case. The first difference tends to undercut any
direct reliance the prisoners might place on the Toscanino decision;
the second suggests that the decision's broader principles may have
an even greater impact on the prisoners' case than they had on the
actual situation in Toscanino. The interplay of these differences
brings our problem into focus.
In Toscanino, American as well as foreign officials were directly
involved in the actions that offended the Constitution. In the case
of a returned prisoner, however, we must assume that American officials are only indirectly implicated through the requirement that they
execute a judgment that rests upon a defect in a foreign proceeding.
This difference is decidedly of some moment; the question is how
much? In answering, it would seem that if fairness and decency in
the whole course of the proceedings can, under appropriate circumstances, be essential to preserving respect for law, then we are working upon a continuum where no fixed line can be drawn between
illegal acts of foreign and American officials. The concern for American justice may be more attenuated if foreign officials alone have
acted illegally. But if the interest at stake is the integrity of the
American courts and the values upon which our whole system of
government is predicated, then the test must be whether there is, in
fact, a complicity by the American system in the illegal foreign actions sufficient to pose a threat to that interest and whether the
93
threat suffices to warrant some remedial response.
91. 500 F.2d at 274 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
92. Although the Second Circuit has not been alone in its sensitivity to these
principles, other courts have not been as willing to go beyond the Ker-Frisbierule.
Before Toscanino, for example, the Ninth Circuit was unwilling to find that official
behavior in the course of an arrest was sufficiently "shocking" to warrant a departure
from Ker-Frisbie. See United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 747-49 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973). The Tenth Circuit noted that the application of such
principles would require overruling Ker and Frisbie, a step it, of course, lacked power
to take. See Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964). Likewise, the Fifth
Circuit considered the application of Toscanino but, after making a distinction on
the facts of the case, applied the Ker-Frisbierule. See United States v. Herrera, 504
F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir. 1974).
93. There are, of course, cases that take a contrary position. For example, in
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With this test in mind, we turn to the second difference. In
Toscanino, the foreign arrest, though brutal, was followed by a trial
before an American court that conformed to the Constitution in all
respects. Certainly, there was no suggestion that the acts of brutality
incident to the prisoner's arrest cast doubt upon the fairness or reliability of his American trial and the determination of his guilt. This
suggests that in applying the broader principle of Toscanino, we must
recognize that the threat to the basic integrity of the American legal
system is far greater in our case than in Toscanino. If reliance upon
a foreign arrest to bring a person into this country for a fair trial can,
because of the brutality attendant to the arrest, pose a threat to our
system, total, unquestioned reliance by our system upon a defective
foreign proceeding as the basis for denying a person his liberty without a trial can hardly pose anything less.
We can legitimately push the analysis even further. If, in the
absence of extraordinary brutality and direct American participation, it is generally thought that the integrity of our system is not
sufficiently threatened by the illegality of a foreign arrest to warrant
overturning a fair American trial, that judgment must depend
heavily upon society's interest in assuring that those fairly found
guilty are punished." It reflects a belief that a failure to punish those
fairly tried may impair the integrity of the courts as readily as undue
complicity in pretrial illegalities. It is a judgment reinforced by the
fact that foreign officials are unlikely to be deterred from future
abuses by the remonstrances of an American court. Where, however,
there has been no American trial and the question of guilt remains
uncertain, the foregoing considerations do not apply. In the absence
of such considerations it cannot be argued that the integrity of our
system will be assured by the mere absence of direct American participation in the foreign proceedings.
Wentz v. United States, 244 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1957), the court answered the argument
that the defendant's arrest by Mexican police and subsequent transfer to American
authorities for trial was a denial of due process:
No illegal act of a United States officer is related by [defendant]. In
the affidavit no action of officers of the United States begins before the
defendant is brought to them in the United States. Therefore, the charge, if
true, must be that the defendant was denied "due process" in Mexico by
Mexicans. If true, that is no legal concern of an American court.
Id. at 176.
It is true that the Constitution does not operate directly upon foreign officials. But
in light of the cases here discussed, the statement in Wentz may have little value
beyond its immediate factual context. It has no force whatsoever where there is an
attempt in an American trial to use a confession obtained by foreign officials, with or
without American participation or inducement, in violation of the fifth amendment.
See notes 98-99 infra and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 14.
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This was indirectly confirmed in United States ex rel. Lujan v.
Gengler,'5 the Second Circuit's next encounter with a foreign arrest
of a foreign national on a charge similar to that in Toscanino. In
Lujan, American officials had not directly participated in the arrest.
It was not that fact, however, that led the court to deny a habeas
petition after conviction, but rather the absence of any "cruel, inhuman and outrageous"" treatment of the kind alleged in Toscanino.
Also relevant was the fact that neither Bolivia nor Argentina had
protested the illegal activity as had Uruguay in Toscanino's case. 7
More persuasive than Lujan, however, are decisions prohibiting
the use of a coerced confession obtained by foreign officials with or
without American participation or inducement. 8 Because the fifth
95. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975). In Lujan, the Second
Circuit was confronted with the foreign arrest of a foreign national who was under
indictment by a federal grand jury in a narcotics case. The defendant had been lured
from Argentina to Bolivia, where he was arrested by Bolivian police in the pay of the
United States and not acting under the direction of their superiors in the enforcement
of Bolivian law. Accompanied by American agents, the defendant was returned to New
York, where he was formally arrested, tried, and convicted. Upon a petition for writ of
habeas corpus, the Second Circuit upheld Lujan's American conviction, refusing to
follow Toscanino. See id.
96. Id. at 65.
97. See id. at 67-68. Unlike Lujan, Toscanino alleged that "the Uruguayan government ... had no prior knowledge of the kidnapping nor did it consent thereto and
had indeed condemned this kind of apprehension as alien to its laws." United States
v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 270 (1974).
98. Decisions involving the use in an American trial of evidence obtained by
foreign officials in violation of the fourth amendment also show an erosion of the idea
that foreign official acts are of no legal concern to an American court. We start with
Birdsell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965),
where the Fifth Circuit declined to bring within the fourth amendment's exclusionary
rule a conviction based upon evidence that foreign officials, acting upon information
received from American agents, had seized in an allegedly unconstitutional manner.
Because the American agents had not sufficiently participated in the seizure, the court
thought that overturning the conviction would not serve the exclusionary rule's deterrent purposes. Nevertheless, Judge Friendly, sitting by designation, added the following note to his opinion:
We do not mean to say that in a case where federal officials had induced
foreign police to engage in conduct that shocked the conscience, a federal
court, in the exercise of its supervisory powers over the administration of
federal justice, might not refuse to allow the prosecution to enjoy the fruits
of such action.
Id. at 782 n.10.
Since Birdsell, Judge Friendly's reservation has been echoed in one form or another by nearly all of the circuits that have considered the problem. See United States
v. Marzano, 537 F.2d 257, 272 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977);
United States v. Cotroni, 527 F.2d 708, 711-12 (2d Cir. 1975); Stonehill v. United
States, 405 F.2d 738, 743-46 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 960 (1969); cf.
Brennan v. University of Kan., 451 F.2d 1287, 1290 (10th Cir. 1971) (civil case).
Arguably, Judge Friendly's noted exception was designed only to deter American
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amendment itself expressly forecloses the use of such a confession, it
is sometimes said that the offense against the amendment occurs not
when the foreign official coerces the confession but when the prosecutor uses it." But such literalism hardly captures the true sense of the
rule established in these cases. Certainly the rule reflects humanitarian concerns. For our immediate purposes, however, the rule reflects principally a concern for the reliability of any statement obtained by coercion. It is concerned with preserving the integrity of
our judicial system and would plainly occupy its present place in our
law, even without express recognition, under the aegis of the due process clause. Accordingly, the principal distinction between an illegal
foreign arrest and a foreign coerced confession is that, in the latter,
the interests of the accused and society coincide more completely;
there is no countervailing concern that those fairly found guilty will
go free. Judged by this consideration, if the question of the returned
prisoner's guilt remains in doubt, his continued imprisonment would
be governed by the coerced confession cases rather than those involving illegal arrests.
At this point, we hasten to acknowledge that nothing we have
said thus far suggests that cases of doubtful guilt are the only cases
that may, under the broader lesson of Toscanino, pose a threat to the
integrity of our system. Certainly, we are not yet prepared to dismiss
all other possible defects in the foreign proceedings. There remains
for consideration the other side of our due process equation-the
governmental claims-which must be assayed, whether guilt is in
doubt or not, before we can reach any constitutional conclusion. Nevertheless, even at this stage it seems plain that where there is a
substantial question regarding the guilt of a returned prisoner, the
weight or urgency of his challenge to the Mexican or Canadian treaty
will exceed the urgency of any other likely challenge. It is this point
officials from precipitating foreign encroachments upon fourth amendment values. But
that seems improbable. If American officials participate directly in the illegal acts, the
exclusionary rule applies without resort to Judge Friendly's exception. Yet, in the
absence of direct American participation in the illegal search and seizure it is difficult
to see how American officials might sufficiently control the foreign police, so as to
achieve the deterrent purpose. It would be anomalous if the exception were intended
to deter American officials from ever requesting the assistance of foreign police. And
if deterrence is the purpose, why limit it only to evidence obtained in a particularly
"shocking" manner? The exception, in other words, appears rooted in a broader normative concern for the integrity of the American system of justice. The requirement
that there be an American inducement to the foreign action serves only as an added
measure of American complicity in the foreign proceedings made necessary because
the case involves an otherwise properly convicted felon.
99. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); United States v. Welch, 455
F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972); Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 986 (1967).
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that leads us to the Second Circuit's latest encounter with the problem of foreign arrests, United States v. Lira.'0
As background to Lira, it should be noted that shortly after
Lujan, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gerstein v.
0°
Pugh,'' which cited Ker v. Illinois'
and Frisbie v. Collins'3 as authority for refusing to invalidate a conviction where the pretrial detention was unconstitutional.' Gerstein appeared to breathe new life
into the Ker-Frisbierule and may even have signaled some disapproval of the doubts concerning that rule that Judge Mansfield had
expressed in Toscanino. "
In Lira, the Second Circuit was once again asked to review the
arrest abroad of a foreign national indicted for narcotics violations by
a federal grand jury. The arrest was made in Chile by Chilean police
acting at the request of American agents. Uncontradicted testimony
established that the defendant had been held by the Chilean police
for over three weeks and that he had been beaten and tortured in an
attempt to force disclosure of information about other participants in
his alleged narcotics smuggling ring.' m In response to this testimony,
the Government merely disavowed any direct participation by
American agents in the actions of the Chilean officials.'1 It admitted, however, that its agents knew of the defendant's whereabouts and accompanied him on the flight back to New York."'
Writing for two members of the panel, Judge Mansfield affirmed
the district court's denial of habeas corpus. Missing from his opinion
was any reference to either the problem of preserving judicial integrity or the principles described by Justice Brandeis." 9 The rule in
Toscanino, Judge Mansfield said, was not rooted in any of these
larger concerns; it was, like the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule, merely a device to deter police misconduct."0 As a result,
Toscanino applied only where American officials were directly involved in the acts of brutality or where foreign officials were acting
as agents of the United States."'
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
420 U.S. 103 (1975).
119 U.S. 259 (1886).
342 U.S. 519 (1952).
See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975).
See generally notes 84-92 supra and accompanying text.
See 515 F.2d at 69.
See id. at 70.

108. See id.
109. Compare United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir. 1974), with
United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
110. See 515 F.2d at 71.
111. See id.
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Although Gerstein v. Pugh 2 obviously had an impact upon the
Lira court, it is far from clear that the questions regarding the need
for a probable cause determination, at issue in Gerstein, even remotely engaged the basic values at stake in Toscanino and Lira."3 Be
that as it may, it cannot be doubted that Lira seriously eroded the
fuller implications of Toscanino. The key question is whether this
erosion extends beyond the problem of foreign arrests to foreign convictions. In other words, does it suggest that there no longer is a due
process problem if our system uses a foreign conviction as the basis
for imprisoning persons within the United States so long as no American official participated directly in obtaining that conviction? Only
if Lira is read this broadly does it undermine the lessons thus far
drawn from Toscanino, Lujan, and the coerced confession cases. If
read this broadly, however, Lira appears to run counter to a number
of decisions in the Second Circuit itself. For example, acting under
the Second Circuit's mandate,' the federal district courts in New
112.

420 U.S. 103 (1975).

113. In Gerstein, the Court held that the state of Florida had violated the fourteenth amendment by permitting persons arrested upon a charge by information or
pursuant to a police officer's on-the-scene determination, but without a warrant, to be
held in custody for extended periods without a probable cause determination by an
independent magistrate. See id. at 114. The Court also observed that it was not retreating "from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction." Id. at 119 (citing Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), and Ker
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886)). Although a detained prisoner had, the Court said, a
constitutional right to "challenge the probable cause for [his] confinement," id., a
conviction was not to be vacated because he had been detained without such a determination, id.
In the abstract, this holding appears to breathe new life into the Ker-Frisbie rule.
Viewed in context, however, it hardly mandates confinement of Toscanino to acts of
American officials alone. In affirming the right to a predetention probable cause hearing, Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Gerstein, fully recognized the subtlety
of the balance he was striking. The right was a practical solution to the problem of
safeguarding citizens "from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from
unfounded charges of crime" on the one hand and the need to "give fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection" on the other. Id. at 112 (quoting
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1946)). The key requirement in this
practical balance was that "'those inferences [of probable cause] be drawn by a
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.'" Id. at 113 (quoting Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)). Nothing here or elsewhere in the opinion
suggests that the Court, in upholding convictions following a detention without such
a probable cause determination, perceived that in the matter of warrantless arrests it
confronted a threat to the basic integrity of American justice comparable to the secret
abductions, beatings, tortures, and druggings that were alleged in Toscanino and Lira.
Indeed, to find a mandate for such a retreat in Gerstein v. Pugh, and then to base that
retreat on the Ker-Frisbie rule, would appear to work a revolution in due process
analysis far greater than any change that might have marked the progress of the law
from Ker to Toscanino.
114. See United States ex rel. Dennis v. Murphy, 265 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1959).
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York have at least twice struck down the state's use of Canadian
convictions under the New York multiple offender statute.'15 In each
instance, the federal court carefully scrutinized the record of the
Canadian proceedings and concluded that, because the accused's
lack of counsel cast doubt on the finding of guilt, the state courts'
attempted use of those proceedings was a violation of due process."'
Of similar import is Republic of Iraq v. First National City Bank,"7
where the Second Circuit refused to recognize even the civil consequences of a foreign decree that it characterized as a bill of attainder." 8 A broad interpretation of Lira would also be difficult to square
with the Second Circuit's expressed reservation against extraditing
an accused in situations where it was shown that the accused "would
be subject to procedures or punishment

. . .

antipathetic to a...

court's sense of decency.""" Finally, there would seem to be something anomalous in an American court's setting aside the United
States Constitution in order to execute a foreign judgment that neither international law nor comity requires it to execute. In short, it
is sensible and even necessary to read Lira in a much more restricted
fashion.
It seems fair to suggest that, in relying upon the exclusionary rule
cases and emphasizing their attendant deterrence rationale 2' as
115. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1941 (McKinney 1967); see United States ex rel. Foreman
v. Fay, 184 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); United States ex rel. Dennis v. Murphy,
184 F. Supp. 384 (N.D.N.Y. 1959).
116. It is true that the cases arising under the multiple-offender statute are
distinguishable from the prisoner exchange situation. Whereas New York sought to
impose additional punishment on those already convicted of violating its laws, the
United States, under the Canadian and Mexican treaties, seeks to improve the conditions under which the prisoners must serve out their foreign sentences. Nevertheless,
in the latter case, the United States is continuing to deprive the prisoners of their
liberties. Its purpose in doing so is relevant only as a possible justification for the
deprivation, not for denying that the deprivation, if predicated upon a foreign conviction without due process of law, raises a threshold constitutional claim.
117. 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
118. Cf. Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 1975) (concluding
that the quality of a foreign criminal proceeding was a relevant factor when the foreign
conviction was the basis for a denial of Social Security benefits to an American citizen). In Cooley, a widow was denied survivor's benefits under the Social Security Act
because she had been convicted in Iran of murdering her husband. Although the Tenth
Circuit apparently accepted her contention that if the deprivation of due process in
the Iranian proceedings was shocking her conviction should not be recognized by the
United States, it nevertheless denied her claim. The court sustained the findings of
the administrative law judge before whom she had fully aired her indictments of the
Iranian system and who had found against her on each of the charges, concluding that
the record "reveal[ed] a criminal process in Iran similar to that in the United States."
Id.
119. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960),
quoted in United States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974).
120. There are two competing views regarding the purpose of the fourth amend-
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grounds for distinguishing Toscanino, Judge Mansfield was moved to
his decision in significant part by the fact that a contrary decision
would allow a guilty felon to go unpunished."' In light of this possiment exclusionary rule. Some view it as merely one of deterrence, while others ascribe
to the rule a more normative design. Much latter day judicial and scholarly commentary has emphasized the rule's deterrent purposes, almost to the exclusion of all others.
See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969); Oaks, supra note 14. The rule is only seen as
deterring police and prosecutors from offending the fourth amendment's guarantee of
privacy. In no small part, increasing doubts about the efficacy of the rule in attaining
this purpose has led to attacks on the rule itself.
The earlier view, which seems to be achieving a renewed but, for want of an
adequate theoretical foundation, uncertain expression, was that the rule secured the
integrity of both the fourth amendment and the judiciary. Quite apart from whether
exclusion deterred police misconduct, it was said that the idea of the police and
prosecutors using illegally seized evidence rendered the fourth amendment meaningless, a provision without value that "might as well be stricken from the Constitution."
Weeks v; United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). More insistently, use of such evidence at trial aligned the courts not merely with a "manifest neglect" but with "an
open defiance of the . . . Constitution." Id. at 394. Thus, the exclusionary rule was
necessary to "preserve the judicial process from contamination." Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 484-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); accord, Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
In spite of the tendency in more recent decisions to downplay the rule's normative
dimension, we suggest that the normative purpose remains a brooding omnipresence
awaiting only the proper factual setting in which to reassert a controlling place in the
judicial mind. Writing for the Court in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), Justice
Powell stated that habeas review of state court decisions regarding the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule was unlikely to enhance the rule's principal purpose, deterrence. See id. at 493-95. This argument, however, was carefully prefaced by the observation that the "imperative of judicial integrity" remained an important justification
for the rule-one with which the courts "must ever be concerned." Id. at 485. The
Justice also noted with approval Judge Friendly's suggestion that the rule be confined
to cases of "flagrant" disregard of fourth amendment values. See id. at 490 n.29 (citing
H. FRIENDLY, BENcHmARKs 260-62 (1967)). He emphasized that, in the case before him,
the police obviously had made a good faith effort to comply with the fourth amendment; two state courts and one federal court had approved the police conduct before
a federal appellate court reversed. In such circumstances, a concern for judicial integrity was obviously misplaced. There was no indication whatsoever that police intrusions of the sort encountered in Rochin, Mapp, or Weeks would encounter a complacent court. For a discussion of the use in an American trial of evidence obtained by
foreign officials in violation of the fourth amendment, see note 98 supra.
121. Judge Mansfield's effort to draw a parallel between the rule in Toscanino
and the exclusionary rule is telling. The linkage, as he saw it, was in their common
purpose to deter the police from acting illegally. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d
68, 71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975). Yet, it seems clear that the historical
shift from a normative to a deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule was largely
dictated by, and given expression in, cases where guilt was not seriously in doubt. In
such instances it was strained to speak of preserving the fundamental integrity of the
judicial system. Where, however, the violation of a defendant's fourth amendment
rights also serves to cast doubt upon his guilt, the deterrence rationale would presumably tend to give way to the more fundamental, normative concerns. See note 120 supra.
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bility, it is difficult to suggest that absent a reasonable assurance of
guilt the judge would have set aside the Toscanino principle as applied to foreign judicial actions merely because no American officer
had directly participated in the offending foreign proceedings. Drawing a distinction between cases where guilt is reasonably certain and
those where it is not also squares with decisions in which American
courts have permitted the use of foreign confessions obtained without
benefit of Miranda warnings'2 when it was clear that the confessions
were not coerced and decisions that refused to apply the fourth
amendment's exclusionary rule to foreign searches and seizures in
nonflagrant cases.' z2
This distinction also finds support from Judge Oakes, who concurred in the result reached by Judge Mansfield in Lira, but who
tendered a sharp rejoinder to Judge Mansfield's theory of the case.12
Judge Oakes began by expressing concern lest the courts forget "Mr.
Justice Brandeis' ringing [Olmstead] phrases.' '1 5 With those values
in mind, Judge Oakes made clear his refusal to draw an impermeable
line between acts of foreign and American officials. Noting that he
had sat on both the Toscanino and Lujan panels, he concurred in the
result reached in Lira only because he thought that the case fell, "just
barely," on the Lujan rather than the Toscanino side of the due
process continuum,' 5 with the absence of objection by Chile removing any possible taint of participation by the courts of the United
States in a violation of international law. But the closeness of the case
in Judge Oakes' mind was underscored by his suggestion that, constitutional necessities aside, the court might eventually be required to
exercise its supervisory power in foreign arrest cases. 12 The judge
explained, "To my mind the Government in the laudable interest of
stopping the international drug traffic is by these repeated abductions inviting exercise of that supervisory power in the interests of the
greater good of preserving respect for law."1
In the absence of a reasonable assurance of guilt, therefore, it is probable that, even
after Lira, the underlying values expressed in Toscanino and Judge Oakes' Lira concurrence, see notes 124-28 infra and accompanying text, stand as the determining
factor.
122. See United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972).
123. See United States v. Controni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967); Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
124. See United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 72 (2d Cir.) (Oakes, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975).
125. Id. Judge Oakes also felt bound to observe, however, that only a few weeks
before, in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Supreme Court had revitalized
the Ker-Frisbierule. See 515 F.2d at 72.
126. See 515 F.2d at 72.
127. See id. at 73 (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942), and
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)).

128. Id.
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Judge Oakes spoke perceptively to that balance upon which the
preservation of respect for our criminal legal processes ultimately
depends: the balance between fairness, decency, and humaneness, on
the one hand, and effectiveness in controlling antisocial behavior, on
the other. No less perceptively, the judge acknowledged that the
nature of the offense charged-the social and human costs implicit
in its perpetration-has a place in that calculus. Most perceptive of
all, however, was his forthright admission that the course of official
conduct in these foreign arrest cases posed a problem for American
justice. Surely a problem exists when American drug enforcement
agents bribe foreign police officials to arrest fugitives, often by means
violative of not only American but also foreign law and with full
knowledge of those officials' propensity for brutality. The problem is
only compounded when American prosecutors and courts stand as
unprotesting beneficiaries of an arrest offensive to all our standards
of decency. At the very least, such actions sufficiently implicate the
American system in the acts of the foreign officials to pose a close
case, answerable, if at all, only because the defendant is given a fair
American trial and found guilty of a crime of major social import. If
this answer suffices, the imprisonment of a person in an American
jail based solely upon a foreign sentence bespeaks a complicity in the
foreign proceedings of a wholly different magnitude when the returned prisoner's foreign conviction gives no reasonable assurance of
guilt.
Finally, we offer a caveat to our suggestion that cases of doubtful
guilt are those in which the weight or urgency of the challenge to the
treaties will exceed any other challenges likely to be encountered. We
cannot ignore the possibility of a foreign conviction based upon a
coerced but totally reliable confession. If protecting the guilt-finding
mechanism is the sole reason for the coerced confession rule, any
foreign confession, however inhumanely coerced, would be accepted
so long as its reliability could be demonstrated. But so long as Rochin
v. California' remains good law, we have not come this far in our zeal
to punish the guilty.' One must hope that we will continue to be
129. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
130. Rochin stands for the proposition that, at some point, the sheer force and
brutality of an official's action will be so abhorrent to our notions of justice that no
matter how reliable the result, the practice will not be tolerated. In Rochin, the police
suspected the defendant of narcotics violations and, without a warrant, broke into his
room. Rochin seized certain capsules and swallowed them. The police then jumped on
him, but, failing to retrieve the capsules, took him to a hospital where a doctor, under
police direction, pumped his stomach. The evidence produced was clearly reliable;
there was no danger of an erroneous conviction. The Court was so repulsed, however,
that it excluded the evidence because it was obtained by "conduct that shocks the
conscience." Id. at 172.
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cognizant of history and remember that the compulsion of selfincriminating testimony is among the most ancient and abhorrent
devices of the tyrant. 3' Nor can we wholly escape tyranny merely
because a foreign rather than an American official applied the coercion. Nevertheless, it would seem that the threat to the integrity of

our institutions and values is relatively weak where guilt is not in
doubt. We are not imprisoning the innocent; our system is not using
the confession for its own prosecutorial purposes; and no American
official has participated in the coercion.
B.

INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTIONAL PRINCIPLES

Thus far we have invoked principles bearing upon the scope of
the Constitution that fall comfortably within a traditional principle
of international comity: the precept that no nation's courts are required to recognize or execute foreign judgments that offend their
fundamental principles. We now move to the question of whether,
insofar as the jurisdiction-selecting principles of international law
tend to limit that freedom, their embodiment in the treaties affects
the constitutional principles thus far adduced, compelling us to strike
a new and different balance. More specifically, we turn to cases dealing with constitutional challenges to extradition and prisoner transfers under the Status of Forces Agreements." 2 These are the decisions
factually closest to our problem. On the surface, they may be thought
to assign a certain preemptive force to the jurisdictional precepts of
international law. In the end, we argue that this is too superficial-that the cases actually underscore the acuteness of the constitu131.

See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458-59 (1966); Culombe v.

Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961); J. BENAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICiAL EVIDENCE
(London 1827); 8 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2251 (3d ed. 1940)
("[Any system of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually
to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof must itself suffer morally thereby.").
132. The purpose of the Status of Forces Agreements, insofar as they pertain to
our discussion, is to provide for the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over American
servicemen and their dependents stationed in a foreign country. Typically, the agreements confirm the "primary jurisdiction" of the host country but prescribe a series of
procedural safeguards that the foreign country agrees to extend to American servicemen when it attempts to exercise that jurisdiction. See note 185 infra. The agreements
also make provision for the possible relinquishment by the foreign country of its right
to try servicemen in favor of an exercise of criminal jurisdiction by the United States.
Finally, the agreements commit the United States to turn servicemen over for trial or
sentencing whenever the foreign country retains its claim of primary right to try them.
The United States currently has some 25 such agreements in force. See S. RP. No.
1434, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1970). See generally J. SNEE & A. PYE, STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENTS AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (1957); Norton, United States Obligations
Under Status of Forces Agreements: A New Method of Extradition?, 5 GA. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 1 (1975).
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tional problem posed by the Mexican and Canadian treaties. Such a
reading is possible, however, only if careful attention is first paid to
the implicit methodology of the decisions.
The seminal decision on extradition is Neely v. Henkel,13 where
the Supreme Court upheld the proposed extradition of an American
citizen to Cuba pursuant to a special statute' u authorizing the extradition of fugitives whenever "any foreign country or territory. . . is
occupied by or under the control of the United States."', Cuba was,
at the time, such a foreign territory."'8 In rejecting the argument that
the proposed transfer was unconstitutional because the petitioner
would not receive in Cuba all the safeguards, especially the right to
due process of law, to which he would be entitled if tried in the United
States, the Court stressed the traditional jurisdictional principles of
international law. The petitioner's United States citizenship did not
confer upon him "an immunity to commit crime in other countries,
nor entitle him to demand, of right, a trial in any other mode than
that allowed to its own people by the country whose laws he ha[d]
violated." 3 '
Yet this hardly sufficed. By turning him over to Cuban authorities, it was the United States that proposed to subject the accused
to a potential loss of liberty by means that violated the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights. Apparently sensitive to this, the Court followed
its jurisdictional discussion by observing that the accused was not
totally without protection. An American court had to determine that
there was probable cause to believe him guilty of the offense
charged. 3 ' In addition, the authorizing statute required that the
American authorities in control of Cuba "secure" to the accused "a
fair and impartial trial."'39 The latter requirement did not necessarily
imply "a trial according to the mode prescribed by this country for
crimes committed against its laws, but [only] a trial according to
the modes established in the country where the crime was committed,
against the acprovided such trial be had without discrimination
'4 0
cused because of his American citizenship.'

Of course, this could mean that the jurisdictional principles were
a wholly sufficient answer to the defendant's constitutional claim,
133.

180 U.S. 109 (1901).

134. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 793, 31 Stat. 656 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3184-3185 (1976)).
135. Id.
136. See 180 U.S. at 120.
137. Id. at 123.
138. See id. at 112, 123.
139. Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 793, 31 Stat. 656 (current version at 18 U.S.C.

§ 3185 (1976)).
140. 180 U.S. at 123.
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and the Court's discussion of the probable cause and fair trial requirements"' were intended to suggest only that a decision based on jurisdictional principles would not yield results offensive to justice. On the
other hand, the Court seemed to sense that jurisdictional principles
were not a wholly satisfactory response to the defendant's arguments.
It seemed to think that, at some threshold level, the Constitution was
engaged. Certainly its references to the protections of a probable
cause determination and the obligations of the executive to secure a
fair trial"' lend credence to this inference. Those references speak to
the question of why extradition would not offend the Constitution-a
question that requires no answer if the Constitution does not apply.
The fact that the Court interpreted the statutory fair trial requirement in very narrow terms-a trial according to foreign modes without discrimination against American defendants-does not necessarily change this. It only shows how far the jurisdictional principles
may have influenced the Court in determining what process was due.
It suggests, in other words, that jurisdictional principles were an
element in what nevertheless remained a question of constitutional
interpretation. This reading appears to be underscored by the way in
which all of the discussion of jurisdictional principles, probable
cause, and fair trials led up to what the Court plainly thought was
the final answer to the defendant's claim. That answer, although
ambiguous, is not without a certain suggestive quality:
In the judgment of Congress these provisions were deemed adequate
to the ends of justice in cases of persons committing crimes in a
foreign country or territory

. .

. "under the control of the United

States," and subsequently fleeing to this country. We cannot adjudge that Congress in this matter has abused its discretion, nor
decline to enforce obedience to its will . .. .
It is not difficult to read the Neely opinion as addressing, in
somewhat embryonic form, a number of separable elements of a due
process analysis. First, it addressed the question of whether the due
process clause was engaged in any manner. Having answered that
question affirmatively, the opinion can be read as turning next to the
question of how much process was due. At this level one can observe
the Court weighing the dangers of working an injustice against the
fact that the defendant's constitutional claims might impinge both
upon the jurisdictional rights of a foreign sovereign and upon the
government's ability to conclude extradition arrangements with other
countries. It then concluded that because the defendant was guaranteed a probable cause determination by an American court and would
141. See id. at 112, 123.
142. See id. at 123.

143. Id.
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be subject to the normal modes of trial in Cuba constrained by the
statutory injunction to the executive, there was no compelling reason
to fear that the defendant would become the victim of injustice.
Confronted then with this kind of question one can also read the
opinion as simply acknowledging that the judiciary had no overriding
reason to overturn the political department's choice. What is missing,
unfortunately, is a more explicit statement of the analytic mode employed, the elements of the analysis, and the weights assigned those
elements."'
If this is a fair construction of Neely, it is vastly different from
the prisoners' cases. Neely involved the extradition of an American
for trial by a foreign judicial system that generally followed fair procedures and whose judgments ultimately were subject to United
States' control. In our case, we are principally concerned with the
execution of a particular judgment of a wholly independent foreign
court where there is no reasonable assurance of guilt. With this distinction in mind, it would be unwarranted to suggest that the jurisdictional principles evoked by the Neely court work any major inroad
upon the constitutional principles thus far tendered. At most, Neely
serves to warn that we cannot wholly ignore the jurisdictional sensitivities of a foreign sovereign in our due process equation. This warning receives more specific content in the cases dealing with Status of
Forces Agreements.
Perhaps because of the absence of an adequately articulated
methodology in Neely, progress in fashioning a sufficient mode of
analysis seemed to suffer a setback when it came to passing upon the
constitutionality of prisoner transfers under the Status of Forces
Agreements. The case of Wilson v. Girard' sets the pattern. The
lower court rejected a serviceman's contention that the Constitution
barred his transfer to Japan because he would not receive a fair trial
by American standards.'46 It did, however, enjoin the transfer on the
ground that American servicemen generally had a constitutional
right to be tried by American authorities for acts committed in the
performance of their duties.'47 In a short, per curiam opinion the
Supreme Court reversed, completely ignoring the petitioner's fair
trial argument and speaking only of his right to be tried by American
authorities.' The Court reasoned that since, prior to the Status of
144. For the leading statement of the balancing mode in determining how much
process is due, see Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
145. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
146. See Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21, 25 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
147. See id. at 26-27.
148. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
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Forces Agreement, Japan had "exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against its law committed within its borders,2'

49

a transfer, as

contemplated by that agreement, represented no more than a recognition of Japan's preagreement rights under international law.'50 Accordingly, the transfer was subject to no constitutional prohibition
but was simply a matter for determination by the executive and
legislative branches.' 5'
The Court's use of jurisdictional principles in Girardis obvious;
the difficulty with the case lies in determining the scope that should
be attributed to that approach. It suffices here to say only that the
Court's silence on the "fair trial" issue does not necessarily imply
that it viewed jurisdictional principles as a sufficient answer to that
question."2 ' Since Girard,the lower federal courts have straddled the
fence between strict concern for the quality of foreign justice and
apparent disregard of that dimension under the traditional principles
of international law." 3 Only in Holmes v. Laird14 did a court appear
to focus exclusively upon the latter.
The Holmes opinion was carefully crafted. It refused to find
Girard controlling, looking instead to Neely v. Henkel."' Ironically,
because it was carefully written, it supplied the wherewithal for demonstrating the carelessness in its use of Neely. Holmes concerned two
149. Id. at 529.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 530.
152. Literally, jurisdictional principles were not employed in response to the
petitioner's "fair trial" argument. Also, since that argument was couched in most
intemperate language and encompassed virtually any agreement pursuant to which an
American might be surrendered for trial to a foreign system, it is difficult to say that
the Court, by its silence, was wholly indifferent to the fairness of trials accorded our
servicemen abroad. On the other hand, the district court's explicit answer to the "fair
trial" argument might have merited some reflections on the adequacy of the Status of
Forces Agreement safeguards under the due process clause. Also, the obvious implications of petitioner's argument for our system of military alliances, the care taken by
Congress in insisting upon fair trial guarantees, and the example of deference to such
congressional scrutiny in Neely, all combined to supply the ingredients for a very
persuasive argument validating those guarantees as a proper measure of the "process
due" American servicemen charged with committing crimes abroad. Silence in this
context, therefore, may be thought to leave an impression that, in light of the existence
of those guarantees, Japan's claim of primary jurisdiction was seen in Girardas the
determinative answer to the petitioner's claim. For reasons we will later discuss, however, this possibility engages other more substantial difficulties and therefore should
be rejected.
153. See, e.g., Williams v. Rogers, 449 F.2d 513 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 926 (1972); United States ex rel. Stone v. Robinson, 431 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1970);
May v. Wilson, 153 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1956). But see Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F.
Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968), vacated as moot, No. 22053 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 1969).
154. 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 869 (1972).

155. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:733

servicemen who challenged the Army's attempt to return them to
Germany for imprisonment after conviction in a German trial allegedly characterized by a lengthy catalogue of procedural infirmities.
Rather than test the sufficiency of the servicemen's charges, some
of which were quite suspect,5I the district court invoked the political
question doctrine and sustained a government motion to dismiss. 57
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed
the dismissal but apparently rejected the lower court's use of the
political question doctrine, addressing itself instead to the service156. The servicemen alleged that the German court had denied them a speedy
trial, the aid of counsel of their choice, effective representation by court-appointed
counsel, the right to confront their accusers, and the opportunity for a fair appeal. See
459 F.2d at 1214. But some of the petitioners' pleadings themselves raise questions
regarding the sufficiency of their charges against the German system. This is so even
if the German proceedings are judged by standards applicable to an American trial.
Judged by any lesser standard, the charges are totally suspect.
For example, the servicemen's allegation that they were denied a speedy trial
"because they were charged in July, 1970, but were not tried until the following December," id., is not, on its face, sufficient to constitute a denial of the right to speedy trial
under the United States Constitution, since the sixth amendment does not specify the
period of delay that is tolerable, and the Supreme Court has held that the constitutional limit depends entirely on the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1972) (upholding the conviction of a defendant who was
not brought to trial for murder until more than five years after his arrest). But see
Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 1376
(1972). The Court has developed a list of factors-length of the delay, reason for the
delay, defendant's assertion of his sixth amendment right, and prejudice to defendant-that must be analyzed and balanced in each case before any decision concerning
whether the right to a speedy trial has been denied can be made. See 407 U.S. at 530.
Furthermore, it is not at all clear that the servicemen were denied the right to
counsel of their choice under the United States Constitution merely because their
request for an American civilian attorney was denied. Although the Constitution requires that counsel be available in all cases in which imprisonment might occur, see
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), defendants do not have an unqualified right
to select their own counsel in place of competent assigned counsel, see, e.g., Drumgo
v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 930, 506 P.2d 1007, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1973). Also, there
was no allegation that the servicemen were able to retain competent counsel but had
been denied that privilege.
It is also important to note that because the German criminal system is inquisitorial, the role of counsel is quite different and less vital than in the American system.
Moreover, recent Supreme Court cases have suggested that the presence of counsel
need not be a necessary requirement for a fair trial. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry,
425 U.S. 25 (1976) (no right to counsel under sixth amendment in a summary courtmartial because it is not a criminal prosecution under the meaning of the amendment);
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (a state criminal defendant may voluntarily
and intelligently waive his right to counsel under sixth amendment). Finally, there is
no indication that the German system is any less capable than the American criminal

system in the search for truth and justice. See generally J. LANGBEIN,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY

157. 459 F.2d at 1214-15.

(1977).
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men's principal contention. 5 The servicemen were not, the court
noted, claiming any constitutional exemption from German jurisdiction; they were simply making an argument parallel to that of the
returned prisoners in our case, namely that "the turnover of an American citizen for service of a sentence imposed in culmination of an
unfair foreign trial is a governmental involvement which the Constitution does not tolerate."'59 The answer to this argument, the court
held, was not in Wilson v. Girard,"' but in Neely v. Henkel."6' As
characterized in Holmes, the lesson of Neely was that "a surrender
of an American citizen required by treaty for purposes of a foreign
criminal proceeding is unimpaired by an absence in the foreign judicial system of safeguards in all respects equivalent to those constitutionally enjoined upon American trials.""'
Two points are noteworthy. First, the Holmes court carefully
read Girardas dealing only with the constitutional authority of the
government to subject servicemen to foreign trials,'63 not as answering
the "fair trial" argument. Second, the court's reliance upon Neely
suggests that the foreign jurisdictional sensitivities apparent in Neely
may cut into our constitutional conclusions far more sharply than
that case seemed to warrant standing alone. The Holmes court was,
however, very punctilious in observing that Neely rejected only the
idea that a foreign trial must exhibit the full "equivalent" of American safeguards.' But surely if Neely held only that a full equivalence
was not demanded, and if it did so under circumstances of some
American control over the foreign proceedings, it left open the possi158. After taking note of the political question doctrine, the circuit court acknowledged that even on issues arising under the Nation's treaties, the courts may still
"have a legitimate and useful function to perform." Id. at 1215. Rather than decide
whether the instant case was or was not within the doctrine's ambit, the court moved

directly to the basic jurisdictional ideas in Girard:
"A sovereign nation. . . has exclusive jurisdiction to punish offenses against
its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its jurisdiction."...
Thus, had appellants been present in West Germany as militarilyunattached civilians, an exercise of West German criminal jurisdiction over
them would indubitably have been appropriate. It seems equally clear that,
absent some countervailing international agreement, such an exertion re-

mained unaffected by their status as American soldiers stationed there.
Id. at 1216 (quoting Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957)). It is not entirely clear
whether Girard was being used to reinforce application of the political question doctrine or as an independent ground of decision.
159. Id. at 1217 (footnote omitted).
160. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
161. 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
162. 459 F.2d at 1219.
163. See id. at 1217-18.
164. See id. at 1219.
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bility that some equivalence was essential where no American control
was possible. The Holmes court, in other words, might properly have
paused before using Neely in so conclusionary a fashion. And if this
is so, one cannot say with confidence how far Holmes extended
Neely's concern for the jurisdictional sensitivities of a foreign sovereign. The extension cannot be denied, but the legitimate boundaries
of that extension remain obscured. All we can do is turn the question
around. If Toscanino, Lujan, and the coerced confession cases reflect
certain basic values of American society, the question is whether the
Status of Forces decisions signal some significant abandonment of
those values or whether they can be read to accommodate them.
That they can and must be read to accommodate these values seems
clear.
With regard to Wilson v. Girard, 5 the accommodation is spelled
out in Holmes; Girard'suse of international jurisdictional principles
should not be extended to the "fair trial" question. If anything must
be read into Girard'ssilence on this point, it is that, given the district
court's assessment of the Japanese system, the interests undergirding
the serviceman's charge simply were not sufficiently weighty to warrant impairing the integrity of the Status of Forces Agreements. Such
a reading means that Girardis of limited value to those who seek to
sustain the Mexican and Canadian treaties. In cases from Mexico
especially, the foreign proceedings will be notable chiefly by their
contrast to the essential fairness of the Japanese system. Moreover,
neither the Mexican nor Canadian treaty is undergirded by a countervailing governmental interest comparable to that at stake in
66
Girard.'
Since one cannot know with confidence how far Holmes must be
read as extending Neely, one is forced to assay its purport through
use of the Neely balancing methodology. As such, Holmes can readily
be seen as resting upon a sub silentio conviction that the interest
served by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) agreements' 7 outweighed the claim of justice reflected in uncertain and
somewhat attenuated charges against the German proceedings. To
accept this interpretation is to admit that Holmes may be of considerable importance in the prisoners' cases. The treaties are not the
product of governmental interests comparable to those at stake in the
NATO agreements, and attacks on the Mexican treaty, in particular,
will be accompanied by charges that raise a problem of justice far
more urgent than anything that confronted the Holmes court. If the
165. 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
166. See text accompanying notes 268-76 infra.
167. See Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding
the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, [1953] 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846.
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prospect of an American court transferring American citizens for
imprisonment abroad constituted complicity in the foreign proceedings sufficient to warrant due process scrutiny, the prospect of the
American government carrying out the imprisonment itself could
'
scarcely represent less. 68
In broader terms, the Status of Forces decisions offer an important analytic lesson. Insofar as the jurisdictional principles of international law underlie the treaty commitments, they do indeed enter
into our due process equation. But they do not enter proprio vigore
as an emanation of the international community. Nor do they negate
the traditional practice of comity that permits American courts to
ignore acts of another sovereign when to respect those acts would
violate fundamental values of American society. Rather, they serve
only to add weight and urgency to the government's political interest
in upholding these treaties. They lend credence to the government's
foreign policy concerns by warning of, and legitimizing, any retaliatory measures that Mexico or Canada might take in response to judicial invalidation of the treaties. This point emerges in what is perhaps
the most intriguing of all the Status of Forces cases, Smallwood v.
Clifford. 109
After commencement of Smallwood's Korean trial, the federal
habeas court was presented with a contention that the "fair trial"
guarantees in the Korean Status of Forces Agreement' 0 were inadequate to assure the minimum protections guaranteed by the Constitution."' The court responded in a variety of ways. First, it stated,
"[P]etitioner asserts several unsubstantiated shortcomings allegedly inherent in Korean courts. The numerous provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement pertaining to the protection of the rights of
the accused are ignored by petitioner."" Having called the charges
unsubstantiated, the court fell back upon the adequacy of the Status
of Forces Agreement guarantees. It buttressed this approach by invoking the jurisdictional perspective and citing Girard:
Furthermore, the petitioner fails to point out to the satisfaction of
this court by what authority the United States may dictate to a
sovereign nation the procedure to be followed by that nation in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction over alleged violators of its crimi168. Indeed, this is the lesson of the New York multiple offender cases, see notes
115-16 supra, and decisions such as Cooley v. Weinberger, 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir.
1975).
169.
14, 1969).
170.
No. 6127.
171.
172.

286 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1968), vacated as moot, No. 22053 (D.C. Cir. May
July 9, 1966, United States-Republic of Korea, 17 U.S.T. 1677, T.I.A.S.
286 F. Supp. at 99.
Id. at 101.
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nal laws. Under international law, the United
States is without au17
thority to infringe upon that jurisdiction.

Finally, the court evoked a more comprehensive view of the whole
matter, treating the petitioner's contention as fatal to all of the Status of Forces Agreements:
Realistically, the question resolves itself into a balancing of the
national interest justifying the stationing of troops abroad against
the possibility of any deprivation of constitutionally protected rights
at the hands of foreign local law which does not conform to American
standards. It is the determination of this court that the national
interest outweighs any other considerations. To argue that under the
applicable rule of international law, visiting forces retain jurisdiction is to close one's eyes to the historical fact that this matter is no
longer left up to the implications of law but is carefully expressed
in agreements which
are explicit qualifications of consent to station
7
visiting forces.1 '

One could scarcely imagine a more varied congeries of ideas, the
existence of which bespeaks the court's sensitivity to the possible
inadequacies of the jurisdictional perspective. The reason for this
sensitivity was not hard to discern. The Korean legal proceedings
unquestionably included a number of suspect practices. Of special
concern was the use of a 900-page investigative report, which concluded that the petitioner was guilty of the crime charged but relied
upon hearsay, conclusional, and opinion testimony of witnesses.'75
Untranslated, the report was put into evidence and would be treated
as conclusive proof of the prosecutor's charge unless the defendant
76
was able to meet the burden of rebuttal.
Perhaps upon closer scrutiny this procedure was sufficiently safeguarded in actual use to meet some basic standard of fairness, which,'
although falling short of what we might tolerate in an American trial,
nevertheless sufficed as the "process due" in this special context. But
this was far from clear. American authorities had already dismissed
the same charges against Private Smallwood because of a total lack
of evidence,7 " and the Korean trial was being held in a climate of very
hostile public opinion. 7 These factors, combined with suspect procedures in the Korean trial, thus evoked a genuine concern for justice
that could not be dismissed simply by reference to the general princi173. Id.
174. Id. at 101-02.
175. See Halloran, G.I. Seeks to Bar Trial by Koreans, Washington Post, Apr.
28, 1968, § A, at 26, col. 1.
176. See id.
177. See Smallwood v. Clifford, 286 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D.D.C. 1968), vacated as
moot, No. 22053 (D.C. Cir. May 14, 1969).
178. See Comment, Due Process Challenge to the Korean Status of Forces
Agreement, 57 GEO. L.J. 1097, 1100 (1969).
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ples of international criminal jurisdiction. Moreover, the court in
Smallwood could scarcely ignore the shortcomings of those principles
themselves. The case exhibited a truly transnational aspect17 for
which the traditional practice of comity was possibly more appropriate.' 0 And it was doubtful that the American courts would have
granted comity to any Korean judgment if the petitioner's allegations
had been proven."' In sum, the jurisdictional precepts of international law could not, in spite of the agreement with Korea, undercut
the force of constitutional values bolstered by the traditional practice
of international comity.
The court recognized all of this and addressed the issue in terms
of the broader due process equation: the potential imprisonment of
an American citizen without a fair trial versus the potentially adverse
effect of intervention by an American court on the nation's system of
foreign military alliances. In purporting to resolve this conflict the
court adopted an impeccable methodology; it utilized the only mode
adequate to the problem, weighing one interest against the other. But
then the questions arise: why was there no evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the petitioner would, in fact, have been denied a
fair trial, and what consequences would the court's intervention actually have entailed for military policy? The court's answer was that
the task of choosing had passed from the judicial to the political
departments. In the end, this might have been the right answer. 82 Yet
there is much to suggest that the court was too hasty in its assessment
of the military implications of the case and that it ignored a basic
structural attribute of the very due process methodology it purported
to follow.
The policy of acknowledging Korean criminal jurisdiction over
American servicemen was tied to the maintenance of our military
alliances. One might even agree that maintenance of those alliances
was a purpose that outweighed justice for Private Smallwood. There
remained, however, the question of rational efficacy.'1 Was the transfer of Private Smallwood, in particular, necessary to avoid frustrating
the larger objective? Was it rationally related to that objective? Ques179. The very existence of the Status of Forces Agreements speaks eloquently to
the proposition that in broader terms the behavior of Americans abroad engages the
interests and concerns of not just the country in which they happen to be, but the
United States as well. It is conceptually inadequate to speak as though the foreign
government alone had a legitimate interest in crimes committed by American citizens
within its territory.
180. See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
181. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); text accompanying notes 6163 supra.
182. See text accompanying notes 183-87 infra.
183. See note 76 supra.
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tions on this point abound, illustrating the level of particularity required by our mode of analysis in order to resolve such difficult problems.
For example, by insisting upon "fair trial" guarantees in our
Status of Forces Agreements, Congress already had correctly judged
that the United States could press for the recognition of substantial
rights without prejudicing its military objectives.'" This suggests
that diplomacy was not wholly impotent to contain the temporary
perturbations that judicial intervention might have engendered.
Without a careful appraisal, however, the court in Smallwood had no
basis for determining whether and with what certainty the possibility
for such nondisruptive judicial action existed.
In fact, if Korea had violated the fair trial guarantees of the
applicable Status of Forces Agreement,'85 it is far from clear that an
American judicial pronouncement upon that point would have
threatened our capacity to maintain troops in Korea. Yet, without a
careful appraisal, such a discriminating judgment was impossible.
Finally, the Smallwood court made no attempt to determine whether
the Korean procedures were unique to that country or were practiced
in other allied nations. Yet, without such a determination, its assumption that a judgment for Private Smallwood would have had a
general disabling effect upon our nation's alliances was highly sus86
pect.
In sum, Smallwood confirms that the jurisdictional precepts of
international law cannot undercut the basic values of the Constitu184.
(1953).
185.

See 99

CONG.

REc. 8780 (1953); S. EXEc. REP. No. 1, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess.

The Korean Status of Forces Agreement provides,
Whenever a member of the United States armed forces or civilian component or a dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of the Republic
of Korea he shall be entitled:
(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;
(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges
made against him;
(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, if
they are within jurisdiction of the Republic of Korea;

(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defense or to
have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for
the time being in the Republic of Korea;
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent
interpreter; and

(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the
United States and to have such a representative present at his trial.
Status of Forces Agreement, July 9, 1966, United States-Republic of Korea, art XXH,
para. 9, 17 U.S.T. 1677, 1698, T.I.A.S. No. 6127.
186. If the failure to turn Private Smallwood over to Korean authorities would
have had other political consequences, they should have been made explicit and judged
on their own merits, not concealed under a blanket concern for our entire system of
military alliances.
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tion, except as they may reinforce the larger public interest reflected
in the nation's foreign policies. At the same time, Smallwood also
illustrates the need to define carefully each of the elements in the due
process equation. It illustrates the need to identify as precisely as
possible the nature and extent of the offense against constitutional
values and to decide, with discrimination, how essential a tolerance
of that offense may be to the achievement of some larger governmental objective.' 7
III. THE GOVERNMENTAL CLAIM
A.

INTRODUCTION

From the cases already reviewed, there emerges a pattern of
relevant interests and attendant measures of importance to guide the
courts in weighing the returned prisoners' constitutional claims. The
same is true for the interests on the other side of the due process
equation. The courts, of course, are not unfamiliar with requests for
the vindication of private constitutional ai'd other legal rights that
impinge upon the nation's foreign policy and security interests. In
dealing with such requests, they frequently strike a certain note of
judicial caution, even of restraint, which, whether explicit or not,
may be thought to signal a search for balance. In the circumstances
animating this caution, in the mode and extent of its exercise, and
in the proffered explanations of it, are to be found standards that are
instructive for our problem.
We begin with cases in which the courts have, under the aegis of
the political question doctrine, abstained from deciding the merits of
a controversy in the way courts normally decide such matters. We
turn, in other words, to cases in which that doctrine appears as an
"ordinance of extraordinary judicial abstention."'' 5 In so doing, how187. For a further discussion of the nuances of this methodology, see Section I(B)
supra; Part IV infra.
188. The phrase is that used by Professor Henldn. See L. HENKIN, FOREGN AFFAM MD Tm CoNsTrrroN 215 (1972). Professor Henkin has suggested that there may
be "no doctrine requiring abstention from judicial review of 'political questions'" in
the sense of questions upon which "the courts forego their unique and paramount
function of judicial review." Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85
YAL L.J. 597, 600 (1976). According to Henkin, the cases in which the concept is used
fall into five different categories. See id. at 622-23. For our immediate purpose, the
most interesting of these are cases in which the courts felt "bound to accept decisions
by the political branches within their constitutional authority" or refused to "find
limitations or prohibitions on the powers of the political branches where the constitution does not prescribe any." Id. at 622.
Plainly Professor Henkin has rendered a singular service in insisting that we must
get rid of a certain confusion in the use of the phrase "political question." There are
clearly cases in which the phrase appears but in which the court concludes that what
the political departments did was constitutional or otherwise legal-that it was within
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ever, we emphasize that the problem of the returned prisoners is not
the boundaries set by the law for the exercise of choice by those departments. In such
cases one can speak of the question as being "committed to the political departments"
only in a very limited sense. The question-the right or the wrong of the action
taken-is committed to the political departments only because the act does not offend
any constitutional or other legal principle and this only because a court has first
decided, according to the mode by which courts decide such things, that this is so. In
this sense, to say that the issue is committed to the political departments is not very
interesting. Certainly, it does not exhaust the possibilities for such a commitment.
There still may be cases where the right or the wrong of the action in legal or constitutional terms, rather than in nonlegal terms, is committed to the political departments
rather than to the courts. This is the form of the commitment that must be found if
the political question doctrine-as an ordinance of extraordinary abstention-is to
exist. It is this form of commitment that Professor Henkin professes not to find.
This is not, of course, the place to review Professor Henkin's treatment of the
cases. But we would register a note of skepticism, largely because Professor Henkin
works at the level of characterization and it may be doubted that the matter can be
settled at that level. Initially, one must keep in mind that a court's refusal to judge
the right or wrong of an action on nonlegal grounds and its refusal to judge on constitutional or other legal grounds (i.e., a true political question) are both refusals rooted in
a constitutional conception of the judicial power. Courts abstain in the first because
the question by its nature is not susceptible of judicial resolution (it is not a question
relating to the boundaries of political power) and in the second because as an institution the judiciary lacks constitutional power to decide, although the question by its
nature is susceptible of judicial resolution. In such a setting, involving a very subtle
set of distinctions within the single constitutional concept of justiciability, one can
readily find reasons to characterize any given case one way or the other. Moreover, if
one relies upon what the courts themselves say about the matters, characterization
becomes a particularly clumsy tool. It is quite possible to find a court affirming that
the right or wrong of a question is committed to the political departments without
saying which is right or wrong-legal or nonlegal. In this ambiguous state of affairs,
one must look beyond characterization to modality.
Ona must start with a definition of what courts do when they decide, a design of
the decisional process. If one observes political factors being considered and weighed
according to the mode by which courts, in our view of the matter, must weigh these
factors in deciding any question, then plainly they are not asserting any lack of constitutional power to decide. Reference in this context to a "political question" is likely
to signal only an appreciation of the political consequences of a decision and a propensity to see those consequences as very weighty. Likewise, references to matters
"committed to the political departments" tend- to signal reliance upon some of the
institutional considerations that we have already mentioned as part of the controlling
decisional mode. Where, however, no such mode is at work where one would otherwise
expect to see it, such references by a court may very well signal a genuine refusal to
decide what it could otherwise decide. Such a refusal would in any sense of the word
constitute an act of extraordinary judicial abstention. The line of inquiry must then
focus upon the factors that, in the particular context of the case, led to the refusal.
While we cannot here canvass the cases, even those reviewed by Professor Henkin, we
refer briefly to Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829), discussed at notes 193-95
infra and accompanying text, and Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415
(1839), discussed at notes 196-97 infra and accompanying text, which although excluded from Professor Henkin's essay, presumably because they involved nonconstitutional challenges to political actions, were included in the sweeping conclusion of his
book. In those cases it cannot be doubted that the Court refused to judge the merits
of a question it might have judged. A contrary view would imply that neither the

1978]

DUE PROCESS

in any strict sense governed by these decisions.' 9 Political context
enters our problem not as a ground for abstaining but as an integral
part of the very constitutional decision the courts will be called on to
make. Nevertheless, among the more persistent elements entering
into the determination of the classic political question is a sense of
the largeness or momentousness of the subject-a concern for the
enormity of the consequences that might attend a judicial intrusion."' In the dimensions used to gauge this element, we find one set
of highly suggestive benchmarks for assaying the weight of the interests undergirding the treaties with Mexico and Canada.
In the first place, there are few truths of which lawyers need a
more constant reminder than the fact that if "no good society can be
unprincipled. . . no viable society can be principle-ridden.'"'" There
is, in a complex democracy, a place for governance based exclusively
upon compromise, expediency, and the political will where reasoned
principles-the law-must not intrude. The line marking out this
special province is, in no small part, the line at issue in that search
for an "ordered liberty" of which the due process clause is perhaps
the most active instrument. There are, of course, institutional considerations that set a political question apart from a due process inquiry.
But in the sense of momentousness-the concern for the largeness of
subject-they find a common element that speaks to the claims of
order over liberty in precisely the same fashion as it speaks to the
claims of the political will over reasoned principles.
One must remember, however, that this sense of momentousness
is expressive of the law's outer limit. The law cannot retreat too early.
Ours remains a society in which most acts of governance are subordinated to reasoned principles. No less so, our society remains committed to the individual liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights: liberties
language of a treaty nor customary international law can ever supply a rule of decision
for an American court. The Court, in other words, refused to judge a question that was,
by its nature, susceptible to the judicial power. And if this is so, the Court's refusal to
judge was, in any sense that is useful, a response to a constitutional ordinance of
extraordinary judicial abstention. See also Swan, Act of State at Bay: A Plea on Behalf
of the Elusive Doctrine, 1976 DuKE L.J. 807, 835-70.
189. This is not to suggest that the political question doctrine could not apply.
Clearly, the prisoners' due process claims involve questions that courts normally decide. See note 188 supra. But, from the cases discussed, we would submit that it is
impossible to establish in the case of these treaties the dimension of political momentousness necessary for the political question doctrine to apply. There are also other
institutional considerations rendering that doctrine inapplicable. See Swan, supra note
188, at 858. These latter make clear that the mere fact that the political momentousness of a case warrants upholding the government in a due process weighing does not
automatically also mean that the case poses a political question.
190. See generally Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, 75 (1961).
191. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAONEous BRANCH 64 (1962).
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that cannot yield to national exigency-to the claims of order-too
cheaply. With this understanding, a characterization of the subjects
that, because of their attendant sense of largeness, belong exclusively
to the political realm supplies an important benchmark for assaying
the weight of the government's interests in any due process analysis.
And on this score, in at least three major lines of decisions, the political question cases touch upon subjects whose largeness exceeds anything exhibited by the governmental interest in our prisoner exchange
treaties.
It will also be apparent from these cases that as the private
claims seeking judicial vindication become more compelling, evoking
increasingly weighty precepts of our democratic order, the line between law and the political will becomes increasingly difficult to
draw. If the political will is to prevail, it must be accompanied by a
correspondingly heightened sense of momentousness. Thus, if under
the tutelage of the political question cases we start by doubting
whether the government's interest is momentous enough to prevail
over some of the returned prisoners' claims, that doubt matures to a
virtual certainty when we observe the greater urgency of the prisoners' constitutional claims compared with the interests at stake in the
political question cases.
Finally, a wider survey of decisions involving private constitutional challenges to the foreign policy or national security interests
of the government, when undertaken with careful regard for the basic
structural principles of our methodology, will serve to replicate the
lessons of the political question cases. Viewed from an historical
perspective, these decisions are a powerful reminder that we must not
temporize with the high standards suggested by the political question
decisions, however wise or humanitarian the treaties might appear at
the moment.
Overall, the instruction of these cases appears clear: neither foreign policy nor national security is a talisman whose engagement
invariably signals the retreat of the courts or the law. Keeping in
mind that we are still working at the initial level of the analysis, the
contrary seems obvious. When constitutional values as weighty as
those potentially involved in some of the prisoners' cases are at issue,
any retreat would require a showing that the affected national interest was much more insistent and far-reaching than anything likely to
be at stake in the Mexican and Canadian treaties. This means that,
especially with regard to the Mexican treaty, the constitutional question is likely to turn upon the unique circumstance that pits one
returned prisoner against all those who remain abroad. 9 ' The diffi192.

See Section IV(B) infra.
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culty of that question-the true dimensions of the case-can only be
fully appreciated, however, if the strength of the constitutional case
against the Mexican treaty is first recognized.

B. THE POLITICAL QUESTION CASES
The seminal decision in the initial line of political question cases
is Fosterv. Neilson,"3 where Chief Justice Marshall refused in a quiet
title action to determine whether West Florida was included in the
1803 Louisiana Purchase."' It would have been unthinkable, the
Chief Justice made plain, for the Court to risk effectively invalidating
all of the political departments' acts of governance over a significant
area of the United States for the period 1803-1819.111
Neilson was followed in Williams v. Suffolk Insurance Co.,',
where the Court was asked to judge a foreign sovereign's claim to
foreign territory under international law," 7 and in Jones v. United
States,"' where the question was whether one of the Guano Islands
was, as the executive and Congress had claimed, territory "appertaining to the United States" for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. 1"
These three decisions-Neilson, Suffolk, and Jones-were relied
upon by the Court in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co." and Pearcy v.
20
' as establishing that the question of when a party was
Stranahan
to be recognized by the United States as de jure or de facto the
government of a foreign territory was a question of policy belonging
193. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
194. See id. at 299.
195. Before invoking the political question doctrine, the Chief Justice was careful
to point out that the area in question had long been claimed by the United States;
the President and Congress had authorized its occupation; and it had been used to
form the Alabama Territory in 1817, and Alabama had been admitted to the Union in
1819. Id. at 299-300, 307-08. But see Dickinson, The Law of Nations as NationalLaw:
"PoliticalQuestions," 104 U. PA. L. REv. 451, 454 (1956).
196. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
197. The dimensions of the controversy and the Court's sensitivity to those dimensions are readily apparent. The Court was asked to decide whether the government
of Buenos Ayres had a valid international law claim to sovereignty over the Falkland
Islands. The executive had denied that claim in the context of a quarrel over seal
hunting rights that culminated in the Navy's expulsion of Buenos Ayrean officials from
the islands. See id. at 419. In holding that the executive's determination was conclusive, the Court said that otherwise one department might consider a "foreign island
or country . . . at peace with the United States; whilst the other would consider it in
a state of war. No well regulated government has ever sanctioned a principle so unwise,
and so destructive of national character." Id. at 420.
198. 137 U.S. 202 (1890).
199. See id. at 204.
200. 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
201. 205 U.S. 257 (1907).
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exclusively to the executive. 2
A related line of cases began with Doe v. Braden,na which held
that the courts lacked authority to inquire into a foreign official's
treatymaking power." That holding has found more contemporary
applications in Terlinden v. Ames,2"5 which involved the authority of
the German Empire to carry out a treaty between Prussia and the
United States, and Clark v. Allen,2 °1 which dealt with the capacity
of Germany to carry out a treaty on inheritance rights during the
allied occupation.
These lines of decision exhibit a common theme that lends a
momentousness to the political and foreign policy interests at issue
that the prisoners' cases could hardly equal. In each, the Court was
asked to decide whom the United States was to consider sovereign in
a community of sovereign states, or to what people or territory the
attributes of sovereignty were to be accorded, or what credence the
United States was to give to those who asserted a right to exercise
202. In earlier decisions such as Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808),
and GeIston v. Hoyt, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 246 (1818), the Court decided that the question of recognition, de facto or de jure, was a question "addressed to sovereigns not to
courts." 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 272 (Marshall, C.J.). In those decisions, however, the
Court appeared to suggest that the question was governed by principles of international law. Not until the Pearcy and Oetgen cases did the Court separate the issue from
international law, treating it as a matter for policy alone. The latter approach accords
with that taken by at least one legal adviser to the State Department. See Memorandum from Green Hackworth, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to Cordell Hull,
U.S. Secretary of State (Jan. 29, 1944) ("Russia v. Poland"), reprintedin 2 M. WHrrEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (U.S. Dep't of State Pub. No. 7553, 1963).
203. 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
204. See id. at 657-58.
205. 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
206. 331 U.S. 503 (1947). In Clark, a 1923 treaty with Germany relating to inheritance rights was upheld against a claim that it was terminated by Germany's defeat
and the subsequent Allied occupation. Relying inter alia upon Terlinden, Justice
Douglas characterized the claim as a "political question" answered by the absence of
any showing that the political departments considered Germany's collapse inconsistent with the maintenance and enforcement of the treaty. See id. at 514. Justice
Douglas was quite prepared to treat the problem as one involving the termination of a
treaty by reason of supervening war; to this end he quoted at length from Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920),
and also cited Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. Town of
New Haven, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 464 (1823). But unlike the cases he cited, Justice
Douglas' opinion undertook no independent inquiry into the compatibility of the treaty
provisions with the interests of the nation either at war or under the succeeding occupational regime. He declared himself prepared to consider the treaty terminated only
if the executive or Congress had "formulated a national policy quite inconsistent with
the enforcement of a treaty in whole or in part." 331 U.S. at 508-09. In light of this,
it would seem preferable to read the case as dealing with the capacity or status of the
treaty partner to carry out its obligations, along the lines of Braden and Terlinden,
rather than as strictly a termination by war case.
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sovereign authority. Decisions on these issues establish the basic
framework and set the controlling climate for all the discrete acts of
policy that the government might later choose to pursue. They are
questions central to the very existence of policy and the ability of the
political departments to give expression to the national interest.
Viewed broadly, they are all encompassed within the recognition
power and as such transcend any particular policy objective of the
kind underlying the Mexican and Canadian treaties.
Admittedly, these cases standing alone demonstrate only a sufficient, not a necessary, standard. Yet, in all of them there was something of a search for balance, and in all of them the balance was very
different from that likely to be encountered in any of the prisoners'
cases. In none were the private interests seeking judicial vindication
undergirded by clear and compelling principles, and certainly none
reached constitutional dimensions." 7 Thus, even if the cases cannot
be read as fixing a necessary standard in all instances, they become
highly suggestive of such a standard when the gravity of the issues
the Court was asked to decide are compared with the weight of the
constitutional claims likely to be encountered in some of the prisoners' cases.
This tendency to search for balance, and its consequent elevation
of the sufficient standard in the recognition cases to that of a necessary standard in our problem, becomes even more apparent when we
turn to certain war powers cases. There the challenge to the government's actions reached constitutional dimensions. The Court was
asked to decide whether the nation was at war or not for purposes of
determining the constitutionality of a purported exercise of the war
powers during the period between the end of fighting and the formal
peace. In every case where an adverse judicial decision might have
impaired the government's ability to determine the basic legal framework for the nation's postwar international relationships, the political
department's determination was held to be decisive."' 5 When a re207. In cases like Neilson and Suffolk, the proffered legal rights had long and
consistently been denied by the political departments and were highly debatable at
best. In Jones, the issue was essentially one of statutory interpretation. Decisions
regarding the constitutional authority of a foreign official (Doev. Braden) or a successor government (Terlinden) or regarding the effect of the war and allied occupation

upon Germany's status as a sovereign (Clark v. Allen), were laced with difficulties for
an American court.
208. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948) (deportation of an enemy
alien); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923) (seizure of "enemy alien"
property). In Ludecke, Justice Frankfurter held that the Court was bound to concede
to Congress the power to grant, and to the President the power to exercise, a deportation authority until the state of war had been terminated, and that "whatever the
mode that termination [was] a political act." 335 U.S. at 168-69. According to Justice
Frankfurter, a contrary holding would suggest that the unconditional surrender and
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quested decision pertained only to discrete acts of policy, however,
that bore peripherally, if at all, upon that framework, the Court
exhibited no reluctance to make its own determination." 9 This was
so even though decisions against the government could have impaired
its ability to act effectively during the uncertain period following the
21 0
end of hostilities.
This necessarily brings us to the recent cases involving the war
in Southeast Asia. One can observe in these cases a direct correlation
between the urgency of constitutional principles seeking judicial vindication and the requisite momentousness of the subject. On one side
of the equation, the private interests asserted were undergirded by a
fundamental, structural postulate of our democracy: the decision as
to war or peace ultimately belongs to Congress, not the executive. On
the other side, the practical intent of virtually all of these challenges
was at least to embarrass the executive, if not actually to terminate
its ability to carry on a major war. In this dimension, the subject-the
potential impact of judicial intrusion upon the conduct of policywas, if anything, even more momentous than that confronting the
Court in the recognition cases.
The result of increasing the stakes on both sides of the equation
was, as could perhaps be expected, a series of increasingly agonizing
decisions. The earliest cases dismissed as political questions all issues
bearing upon the departmental allocation of the power to wage war."'
As the intensity of concern with the executive's assumption of power
increased, however, all of the circuit courts reviewing the issue asserted their authority to decide, on the basis of the nature and extent
of the hostilities, whether some form of congressional authorization
was constitutionally required. They all answered the question as apdisintegration of the Nazi regime had "left Germany without a government capable of
negotiating a treaty of peace." Id. at 170. This was a clear echo of the Doe v. Braden
principle as elaborated in Terlinden v. Ames and Clark v. Allen.
209. See Woods v. Cloyd Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948) (postwar rent controls);
Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947) (postwar reorganization of the wartime price control agencies); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919) (continuance of wartime prohibition).
210. This distinction is also supported by the fact that when asked to decide
whether a condition of war in the international legal sense exists between this nation
and any foreign power, as in the case of a prize of war, the Court has uniformly followed
the latest utterance of the political departments, whether in the form of declarations,
treaties, joint resolutions, or other competent acts. See Herrera v. United States, 222
U.S. 558 (1912); Ribas y Hijo v. United States, 194 U.S. 315 (1904); The Buena
Ventura, 175 U.S. 384 (1899); The Brig Amy Warwick (Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black)
635, 688-92 (1862).
211. See Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
934 (1967)" Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 665 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945
(1967); Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 411 U.S. 911
(1973).
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plied to Southeast Asia affirmatively."' Yet, each of the circuits refused to take any action that might embarrass the executive's conduct of the war, dismissing all complaints under one or another of the
Baker v. Carr21 political question criteria.21'
Whatever uncertainties may exist in the fuller interpretation of
these decisions 21 it is enough to observe how, under the press of a
212. See Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Massachusetts v.
Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970).
213. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In full, Baker v. Carrsuggested the following tests for
a political question:
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking an independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
214. The First and Second Circuits found sufficient authorization in the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384 (1964) (repealed 1971), and other
congressional acts, saying that the form of the authorization and any further question
as to the actual intent of those measures posed political questions. See Massachusetts
v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 33-34 (1st Cir. 1971); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1041-43
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971). After the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was
repealed, the Second Circuit found that the President and Congress were winding down
the war and declared that the method and means chosen for doing so were political
questions. See DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
979 (1972). The charges that additional congressional authorizations were necessary
before the President could mine the harbors of North Vietnam, see DaCosta v. Laird,
471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973), or mount the Cambodian incursion, see Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974), were
characterized as challenges to tactical decisions that could not be assessed by any
judicially manageable standard. Even the District of Columbia Circuit, while asserting
its power to decide that none of the proffered congressional authorizations showed an
intent to sanction the continued level of hostilities, made its escape, in Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Mitchell the court found that the defendants,
all officials of the Nixon administration, were committed by policy to ending the war.
This the President could do as Commander-in-Chief without congressional warrant.
How and at what speed it was accomplished was a question upon which a court would
not substitute its judgment for the President's, absent a clear showing of bad faith.
Id. at 616.
215. These decisions can, of course, be read as affirming the power of the judiciary to decide the question of war or peace, if that decision is for peace and is merely
consequent to deciding the issue of the executive's constitutional competence to prosecute a war. Thus read, they may be thought to find support in the Prize Cases, where
the Court did purport to determine the scope of the presidential power as Commander-in-Chief. See The Brig Amy Warwick (Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
On the other hand, apart from uniformly refusing to embarrass the conduct of the war,
the courts affirmed their power to decide on the necessity of a congressional authoriza-
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large and insistent constitutional principle, the courts moved, albeit
fitfully, to recognize that the claim of law might prevail over what is
possibly the most momentous of all political questions, that of peace
or war. For our purposes, it seems fair to suggest that continued
incarceration, at least of the returned prisoners whose guilt has not
been reasonably established, would present an offense against constitutional values only slightly, if at all, less insistent than the values
at stake in the Southeast Asia cases. If this is so, then the governmental interests served by our treaties should exhibit no less an urgency
than the governmental objective at issue in those cases. But however
innovative as a cooperative device in international law enforcement,
and however useful as a means of improving relations with other
countries, the Mexican and Canadian treaties simply do not engage
national purposes of such a magnitude. From a broader perspective,
when the dimensions of the public objects dealt with in the Southeast
Asia and the recognition cases are considered, one may argue that
these cases engaged the kind of issues that go to the very capacity of
the nation to exist, or at least to function as an independent sovereign
in the international community. 26 As such, they were not in opposition to, but reflected a necessary condition for, the preservation of
liberty. Certainly, the Mexican and Canadian treaties can make no
such claim.

C.

A WIDER SURVEY

If we venture a wider.survey of decisions involving private constitutional challenges to the foreign policy or national security interests
of the government, we can replicate to a remarkable extent the lessons drawn from the political question cases.
Reid v. Covert"7 is the point of departure. Decided within a
month of Wilson v. Girard,"'s it puts Girard and the other Status of
tion only insofar as they were assured of finding just such an authorization, or finding
that the decision for peace had been made and the President was merely carrying out
that decision. Certainly, they avoided any inquiry that might have shown that there
was no authorization or that the President was not ending the war. In view of this, they
can also be interpreted as asserting a judicial power to act only where there is evidence
that the authority for war has been explicitly withheld from the executive, that is,
where there is a direct conflict between the political departments. See Atlee v. Laird,
347 F. Supp. 689, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem., 411 U.S. 911 (1973). See also
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (where the President
had taken action on a claim of plenary power, the Court attributed significance to the
prior, express refusal of Congress to authorize the action).
216. For an intriguing discussion of the political question doctrine as limited to
cases where the Court is being asked to undermine the existence of the very authority
from whence it derives its own powers, see Weston, PoliticalQuestion, 38 HRv. L. Rzv.
296 (1925)"
217. 354 U.S. 1 (1957), rev'g on rehearing351 U.S. 487 (1956).
218. 354 U.S. 524 (1957), discussed at notes 145-51 supraand accompanying text.
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Forces cases in a very instructive light. In Reid, the Supreme Court
invalidated the provisions of certain executive agreements with Great
Britain and Japan under which the civilian dependents of military
personnel accused of committing capital offenses abroad were to be
tried by courts-martial. Although the plurality opinion by Justice
Black dealt with the question in more or less categorical terms, " ' the
dissenting opinion 2'1 and the opinions of Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan, concurring in the result," 1 engaged in a thorough weighing
of the competing interests in the case.12
To Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, the government's interest in
maintaining military discipline, including discipline over dependents
who were viewed by the host government as an integral part of our
military establishment, could not be gainsaid.2 2 On the other hand,
a denial of court-martial jurisdiction in such cases would not, they
thought, leave the government powerless to serve those ends. Congress still could provide for civilian trials in the United States, or the
dependents could, like other American civilians, be tried by foreign
courts. With these alternatives available, any added value of a courtmartial as a deterrent against lawless behavior by military dependents was not sufficient to override the importance of a grand jury
indictment and a jury trial in a capital case where those procedural
safeguards were peculiarly significant. 24 To the dissent, the importance of subjecting military dependents abroad to military discipline
and the practical difficulties attending any alternative mode of trial
meant that the provisions in question reflected the "least possible
'2
power adequate to the ends proposed.' n
219. See 354 U.S. at 21, 39-40. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and
Brennan joined Justice Black in the plurality opinion.
220. Justice Clark wrote a dissent in which Justice Burton joined. Id. at 78.
221. Justice Whittaker took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Id. at 41.
222. There was, on the one hand, the petitioners' interest in being tried by a jury
upon an indictment by a grand jury and in a forum free of executive control, all as
provided for in article III
and the fifth and sixth amendments and denied to them in
a court-martial. The government, on the other hand, asserted that the use of courtsmartial in such cases was essential to the maintenance of military discipline and to
good relations with our allies. Provisions for the use of such courts, it argued, represented a proper exercise by Congress of its power to "make rules for the Government
and Regulation of the land and naval forces" as supplemented by the necessary and
proper clause. Id. at 20. Thus joined, the issue was, in Justice Harlan's words, "one of
judgment, not of compulsion," analogous "to the issue of what process is 'due' a
defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular case." Id. at 75 (concurring
opinion).
223. Id. at 47, 71-72.
224. Id. at 47-48, 77-78.
225. Id. at 86-88.
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Two points are important here. The agreements in Reid ultimately were designed to ensure that the United States would have
continuing access to military bases in Britain and Japan. In this
regard, they were linked to the larger matter of American cold war
strategy. In this context, all of the Justices who followed our basic due
process mode conceded that the broader governmental interest standing alone sufficed to override the petitioners' constitutional claims.
Their disagreement was solely over the necessity of impairing those
rights in order to achieve that purpose. All of these Justices agreed,
in other words, that a basic structural element of their constitutional
inquiry was the need to differentiate between a decision that would
totally frustrate a governmental objective and a decision that only
forced the government to search for other, albeit less effective or
practicable, means of achieving its purpose.
It is this means-ends element in the structure of our basic methodology28 that places Girardinto much sharper focus. In both Reid
and Girard,the ultimate governmental objective was the same: assuring continued United States access to foreign bases as part of a
global military strategy. But the particular governmental acts being
judged in the two cases were very different when viewed in terms of
their "essentiality" to this larger purpose.
On the only issue addressed in the Girardopinion, the Court was
asked to hold that no American serviceman could ever be subject to
a foreign trial for an offense committed in the performance of his
duties. In dealing with this question, the Court could hardly ignore
that a decision favoring the servicemen could prejudice the nation's
entire system of foreign bases. This was underscored by the strength
of Japan's interest in asserting its jurisdiction and the fact that its
interest was sanctioned by the traditional jurisdictional precepts of
international law. In light of this recognition and the momentousness
of the objectives at issue, the Court in Girardwas virtually compelled
to cast its choice, not in terms of the particular means selected by
the government to achieve its objectives, but in terms of those objectives themselves. This is a far cry from the situation in Reid where
the availability of alternative forums immediately cast doubt upon
the "essentiality" of the courts-martial as a means of subjecting
military dependents to the discipline of the criminal law.
Seen in this light, the Court's refusal in Girard to impose a
constitutional limitation upon the exercise of foreign jurisdiction over
American servicemen cannot be read to imply a lack of constitutional
concern for the fairness of a foreign trial. As the lower court opinion
makes clear, there were numerous possibilities for scrutinizing the
essential fairness of those trials without threatening either the basic
226.

See note 76 supra.
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policy or the larger purpose of the Status of Forces Agreements.m
This also means that the choice in Girard was, on both sides of the
due process equation, a far cry from the choice likely to arise in the
returned prisoners' cases. On the governmental side, Girard dealt
with purposes only slightly less momentous than those in the political
question decisions and far exceeding anything underlying the Mexican and Canadian treaties. On the private side, the servicemen's
claim to immunity from all foreign jurisdiction could hardly be said
to invoke the fundamental concern for justice likely to attend some
of the prisoners' claims.
If the Court was dealing with "personal rights" under the Constitution in Reid and Girard, comparable dimensions emerge in cases
dealing with due process challenges to the deprivation of "property
rights." United States v. Pink228 and Sardino v. Federal Reserve
Bank 8 are illustrative. In Pink, a deprivation of property worked by
the Litvinov Assignments2 was upheld because, inter alia, those
assignments were seen as essential to the settlement of claims that
had long stood as a major barrier to recognition of the government of
the Soviet Union. 1 As Justice Frankfurter asserted in his concurrence, recognition was not "an exercise in abstract symbolism," but
the "assertion of national power towards safeguarding and promoting
our interests and those of civilization. ' ' 2 2The latter is a plain reference to the rising dangers of Hitlerian Germany and the perceived
urgency of a Soviet-American accommodation. In Sardino, Judge
Friendly held that the freezing of Culan assets under the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations23 was a "deprivation" of property within
the contemplation of the due process clause, but that it was not such
a deprivation as was proscribed by that clause.? While the United
States was not formally at war with Cuba, the Judge said, it was
"only in a technical sense . . . at peace," and the "founders could
not have meant to tie one of the nation's hands behind its back by
227. See Girard v. Wilson, 152 F. Supp. 21, 24 (D.D.C.), aff'd in part,rev'd in
part, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).

228. 315 U.S. 203 (1941).
229. 361 F.2d 106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
230. By the Litvinov Assignments, the Soviet government assigned to the United
States all assets located in this country to which the Soviet Union laid claim under
its various nationalization decrees. The assigned assets were to be used to pay American claims against the recently recognized Soviet government. The agreement is set
forth in an exchange of letters between Maxim Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign
Affairs, and President Franklin Roosevelt. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PuB. No. 3663, 2
FOREIGN RLATiONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1933, at 812-14 (1949).
231.
232.

315 U.S. at 229-30.
Id. at 241.

233. 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1977).
234. See 361 F.2d at 111.
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requiring it to treat as a friend a country which has launched a campaign of subversion throughout the Western Hemisphere."," Since
the returned prisoners' cases will present no such weighty governmental interest but, in some instances, will present private constitutional
claims of equal if not greater urgency, Pink and Sardino stand as
persuasive precedent for upholding the returned prisoner's due process claims. 8
235. Id. at 112.
236. The question of when and under what circumstances the government may
confiscate private property without running afoul of the taking or due process clauses
of the fifth amendment is a vast and complicated subject lying well beyond the scope
of this Article. Nevertheless, even a sketchy outline suggests that confiscation-as
distinct from police power and wartime regulation-has been permitted only in
connection with the conduct of a war or some other pressing national exigency. This
history, in other words, lends credence to the lessons of Pink and Sardino.
As early as Ware v. Hylton, 2 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796), and again in Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814), the power of the government to confiscate all alien enemy property located in this country at the outbreak of war was plainly
recognized. On the other hand, while such property was frequently sequestered for the

duration of hostilities, see 6 G.

HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw 576 (U.S.

Dep't of State Pub. No. 1961, 1943), outright confiscation appears to have been very
limited, except in the case of a prize, until World War I. In Brown, Chief Justice
Marshall called it a "harsh right," not one that "modem international usage would
sanction." 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 123. See also Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 224-25,
128 N.E. 185, 192 (Cardozo, J.), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920); Brochard, Treatment
of Enemy PrivateProperty in the United States Before the World War, 22 Am. J. INT'L
L. 636 (1928). After the passage of the Trading with the Enemy Act, ch. 106, 40 Stat.
411 (1917) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 95a, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-39 (1970)), however,
not only were alien enemy assets seized, but the Court had little difficulty giving
constitutional sanction to the postwar disposal of those assets for such public purposes
as the government saw fit. See Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308, 314 (1952)
(whether the refusal to return seized property was "simply to secure claims of American citizens against Germany or was regarded as the rightful withholding of spoils of
war" was of little consequence); United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S.
1 (1926).
This power reached its furthest extent with the 1941 amendments to the Trading
with the Enemy Act, see Act of Dec. 18, 1941, ch. 593, § 301, 55 Stat. 839, amending
12 U.S.C. § 95 (1940) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 95a (1970)), which authorized
the seizure of property nominally in the hands of "friendly" aliens but "tainted" by
enemy control during any "period of national emergency" and not just formal war.
The Act was upheld in Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark, 332 U.S. 469 (1947), as a
proper exercise of the war power because that power, the Court thought, permitted any
"reasonable preparation for the storm of war" and because it was reasonably designed
to forestall the removal of "earnings or wealth out of this country to territory where it
may more likely be used to assist the enemy than if it remains in the hands of this
government." Id. at 476. But the Court made clear that the government would have
to compensate fully the friendly alien for the assets seized, if he could prove the
absence of enemy control. See id. at 480. Silesian-American thus provided the basic
underpinnings for upholding the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R.
§ 515.201 (1977). See Sardino v. Federal Reserve Bank, 361 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 898 (1966).
Necessarily, the problem for the Court became much more acute when it moved
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Finally, to show how widely the magnitudinal standards and the
structural concern with rational efficacy cut across the foreign policy
and national security cases, we turn to the Japanese internment decisions.7 As unseemly examples of judicial capitulation to popular
excitement, these decisions also serve to remind us of how adherence
to such standards is utterly critical to the integrity of our democratic
institutions.
The first case in this series was Hirabayashiv. United StatesM
where the Supreme Court upheld a conviction for the violation of a
military curfew applicable only to Japanese citizens and American
citizens of Japanese origin.21 The curfew was challenged as a discriminatory act violative of the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Forgoing, for the moment, the wisdom of hindsight and viewing
the situation as of the time of the government's action, a reasonably
limited curfew per se would seem to have been a wholly unexceptionable, even essential, military expedient. One can hardly doubt that
the wartime prevention of sabotage and espionage to which such a
measure was addressed would readily have overridden any temporary
impairment of such constitutional liberties as it might have infringed. 0 This, of course, was no answer to the charge of discriminato wartime confiscations of nonenemy property. The very measure of the difficulty is
seen in the Court's use of a highly formalistic distinction between a permitted wartime regulation and an impermissible, outright taking. See United States v. Central
Eureka Mining, 357 U.S. 155, 182 (1958) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United States v.
Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952).
Finally, peacetime assertions of the confiscatory power, not bottomed upon police
power regulations, have made very little headway save under circumstances of the
gravest exigency. For example, in Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935),
the Court upheld Congress' abrogation of "gold clauses" in all local governmental and
private obligations as an incidence of Congress' power to "coin money" and "regulate
the value thereof," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5, emphasizing that a denial of that power
would work a profound "dislocation of the domestic economy." 294 U.S. at 315. Debtors, the Court pointed out, would "under [the] gold clauses. . . be required to pay
one dollar and sixty-nine cents in currency while respectively receiving their taxes,
rates, charges and prices on the basis of one dollar of that currency." Id. at 315-16. In
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), however, the Court was presented with
the abrogation of such clauses in the federal government's own obligations. In response,
it said that abrogation would be "not the practice of economy, but an act of repudiation," which was constitutionally impermissible. Id. at 353. Nevertheless, moved by
the disastrous consequences that full payment would have had on efforts to balance
the federal budget, the Court denied to the bondholders damages measured by the
change in currency value against which the clause was intended to secure. See A.
Nussmum, MoSEv IN THE LAw 364 (1950); Swan, supra note 188, at 888.
237. See generally Dembitz, Racial Discriminationand the Military Judgment:
The Supreme Court's Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REv. 175 (1945);
Rostow, The JapaneseAmerican Cases-A Disaster,54 YAmE L.J. 489 (1945).
238. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). See also Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943).
239. See 320 U.S. at 105.
240. See id. at 112-13 (Murphy, J., concurring).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:733

tion. Yet a unanimous Court found that the experience with Japanese
saboteurs at Pearl Harbor, the Japanese system of dual citizenship,
the traditional ties maintained by many Japanese Americans to their
ancestral home and customs, and the need for rapid action that made
it impossible to distinguish between loyal and disloyal Japanese, sufficed to forge a rational relationship between the curfew order as
limited and its legitimating purpose.24 ' Responding to the obvious
argument that a curfew applicable to everyone would have achieved
the government's basic objective without any constitutionally suspect discrimination, the Court stated,
In a case of threatened danger requiring prompt action [the argument would confront the government with] . . .a choice between

inflicting obviously needless hardship on the many, or sitting passive and unresisting in the presence of the threat. We think that
constitutional government, in time of war, is not so powerless and
does not compel so hard a choice if those charged with the responsibility of our national defense
have reasonable ground for believing
24

that the threat is real.

One may certainly question the wisdom or force of this argument
even in the wartime context in which it was issued. Nevertheless, it
is plain that the Court thought that a decision holding the curfew
unconstitutional would impinge upon the ability of the government
to carry out an important military objective; by imposing a "hard
choice" on the government, the nondiscriminatory alternative would
have impaired the objective itself.
The point is even plainer in Korematsu v. United States,2 4 where
the Court upheld a conviction for violation of an order excluding all
2 44
persons of Japanese ancestry from the threatened West Coast area.
To the majority of the Court, if a curfew was valid, so was an exclusion order. But this time strong dissents were heard on two separate
bases. Justice Murphy argued that the total and indefinite exclusion
of all persons of Japanese ancestry from the entire West Coast bore
no rational relationship whatsoever to the narrow object of protecting
the country against sabotage and espionage.2 45 The curfew order was

suspect enough; total exclusion went too far. In what must surely
stand as one of the more notable indictments of this unhappy chapter
in our constitutional history, Justice Murphy described the exclusion
order as nothing but the product of "the misinformation, half-truths
and insinuations that for years have been directed against Japanese
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

See id. at 90-91, 96-99.
Id. at 95.
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
See id. at 219.
See id. at 234-35 (dissenting opinion).
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Americans by people with racial and economic prejudices."'4
Justice Roberts was less certain, arguing that if the exclusion
order had been temporary, it might have been considered essential
to the government's objective.27 What distinguishes his dissent from
the majority, however, is his characterization of the government's
action. Had the petitioner complied with the exclusion order by leaving the designated military zone, he would have violated a parallel
antiremoval order. The only way he could have complied with both
orders was to surrender himself for transfer to a relocation center or,
as Justice Roberts insisted, "concentration camp. '28 According to
the Justice, this combination of measures, applicable to all persons
of Japanese ancestry without regard to their loyalty, bore no rational
relationship whatsoever to the legitimate objects that the government
24
said it was pursuing. '
Finally, in Ex parte Endo,250 a unanimous Court ordered an
American citizen of Japanese ancestry released from a relocation center after the government admitted that she was not disloyal.2 1 The
Court ruled that her continued retention, justified by the government
on the ground that otherwise she would encounter difficulties in her
home community, constituted no part of the national security ration2
ale that alone had been used to justify the relocation program. 2
Admittedly, these Japanese internment cases deal with an equal
protection problem somewhat removed from the returned prisoners'
cases. We certainly do not mean to suggest that one can automatically transfer the categorizations of traditional equal protection
analysis-compelling state interest and rational relationship-to a
means-ends analysis under the due process clause. Nevertheless, the
cases are useful on a more modest level. They demonstrate the willingness of the Court to scrutinize the rational relationship between a
particular government act-curfew, exclusion order, or relocation
order-and the acknowledged wartime need to protect the nation
against espionage and sabotage. This bespeaks a willingness to undertake a similar analysis under the due process clause whenever a
particular governmental act claims to be justified by, and to derive
its importance from, the nation's larger foreign policy objectives.
Moreover, it is the special context of these cases, especially their
wartime setting, that alone can explain this unfortunate lapse of
judicial concern for the fundamental values of our society. If any246. Id. at 239.
247. See id. at 225 (dissenting opinion).
248. Id. at 230.
249. See id. at 226.
250. 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
251. See id. at 294.
252. See id. at 297, 301-04.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:733

thing, one turns to these cases as a reminder that we must never again
yield up those values at too cheap a price.253 While the blind prejudice
sanctioned by these decisions is not a problem in the Mexican and
Canadian treaties, we cannot ignore the danger that, if upheld, the
treaties might result in the systematic imprisonment of hundreds of
Americans whose guilt was uncertain and whose convictions would
offend our basic ideas of fairness and decency.
IV. THE FINAL CALCULUS
A.

A

CATALOGUE OF CASES

In summary, two disparate strands of the argument must be
drawn together. Perhaps because the governmental interests at stake
in the Mexican and Canadian treaties do not evince the momentousness that runs through the political question cases, no deviation from
a strict compliance with American constitutional safeguards should
be tolerated.2 - On the other hand, Neely v. Henkel 5 reflects a contrary and, we suggest, a more persuasive position. The decision to
extradite, at least in the context of that case, scarcely stood on an
equal footing with a decision to recognize a foreign government or
establish and maintain foreign bases as part of the nation's global
military strategy. Yet, the Court in Neely quite plainly held that
strict compliance with all due process and other constitutional safeguards was not required. 6 The practical and historical sense of that
decision seems quite plain: the opposite determination would have
rendered extradition treaties with most, if not all, foreign governments constitutionally suspect.
Applying the approach of Neely to our situation, one finds a
certain parallel between the governmental interests served by an extradition treaty and those served by the prisoner exchange treaties.
Therefore, since the critical distinction between Neely and the returned prisoners' cases arises out of the prospect that under the exchange treaties innocent persons will be imprisoned in American
institutions,"7 it would seem that when such a danger does not exist
-when the only constitutional standards violated by the foreign proceedings are prophylactic or deterrent in their purpose-the Neely
balance should control. This is especially true since these lesser violations are undoubtedly of the kind that the Court in Neely recognized
253. Cf. Duncan v. Kahanomoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (regarding imposition of
martial law in Hawaii during World War II).
254. One can find something of this in the New York multiple offender cases. See
notes 115-16 supra.
255. 180 U.S. 109 (1901), discussed at text accompanying notes 133-44 supra.
256. See id. at 122-23.
257. See text accompanying notes 144-68 supra.
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as constituting the major difference between American and Cuban
trials.
Acceptable lesser violations would include such matters as a
failure to give Miranda warnings28 or to apply the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule in nonflagrant cases.29 It would seem to
constitute only a modest extension of Neely to follow its approach in
cases of arrests 20 and searches and seizures that violate our basic

.ideas of fairness or notions of privacy but are not accompanied by
excessive brutality. 6 ' The same seems true for cases of undue delay
in a prisoner's foreign trial, if the delay affects only his interest in
avoiding "undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial" 6 ' or in
minimizing the anxieties accompanying public accusation.0 3 Supportive of these conclusions is the fact that all of the constitutional
values offended by these defects speak to our sense of humaneness in
the administration of criminal justice. To the extent, therefore, that
a returned prisoner benefits from the humane impulses of the treaty,
any threat to these humane values that might result from his continued imprisonment would seem substantially mitigated.
Matters such as the presumption of innocence and the right of
trial by jury present a somewhat more difficult issue. It can hardly
be doubted that we assign these rights a high place in measuring the
fairness of our criminal justice system.2" Particularly with regard to
the presumption of innocence, we tend to view its absence in other
systems as the harbinger of an arbitrariness we consider intolerable.
But for our purposes this is not the standard. We must inquire
whether a foreign system's failure to accord an accused these safeguards would impair the basic integrity of American institutions
when they undertake to execute a foreign sentence. The answer to
this, we submit, is negative. It is well to keep in mind that the presumption of innocence and the right to trial by jury do not command
universal allegiance.26 Notwithstanding our own convictions, we
258. See United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972).
259. See United States v. Controni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967); Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
260. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886);
Wentz v. United States, 244 F.2d 172 (9th Cir. 1967).
261. See United States v. Controni, 527 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1975); Brulay v. United
States, 383 F.2d 345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 986 (1967); Birdsell v. United
States, 346 F.2d 775 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 963 (1965).
262. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 121 (1960).
263. See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
264. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
265. See generally European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, § 1, arts. 5-7, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, E.T.S. No. 5, reprintedin
45 AM. J. INT'L L. 24, 25-26 (Supp. 1951); InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political
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must recognize that other systems can reach fair results by other
means, despite our well-founded skepticism concerning their overall
performance. Consequently, even if these rights are fundamental
when we deal free of foreign restraints, compromise is possible when
we deal in the international setting. The absence of these rights certainly must have been among the principal differences between the
United States and Cuba that the Neely Court had in mind. "6 Against
this background, defects in regard to the presumption of innocence
and the right to trial by jury would not seem sufficient to override
the public purposes served by the Canadian and Mexican treaties.
Foreign convictions based exclusively upon hearsay evidence should
be treated similarly, unless the quality of that evidence raises doubts
about the basic finding of guilt.
When we move to cases involving the use of coerced confessions
that are inherently reliable or have been sufficiently corroborated to
allay reasonable doubts about the finding of guilt, the balance becomes as close and difficult as any likely to be presented.267 When the
record of the foreign proceedings discloses procedural deficiencies
that cast serious doubt on the basic determination of guilt, however,
the balance moves decisively in favor of the prisoner's claim. If defects such as coerced or otherwise fraudulently induced confessions,
total reliance on hearsay that is otherwise suspect, and the lack of
effective assistance of counsel are accompanied by evidence of brutality, the prisoner's claim is only reinforced. Drawing upon all that
has been said-the principles of Toscanino, Lujan, the coerced confession cases, and the contrast to Neely and Holmes-it scarcely can
be doubted that such claims raised by returned prisoners will present
a formidable constitutional challenge. From the contrast to the political question cases, the Status of Forces cases, and the other cases that
we have discussed and from the balance that was involved in those
cases, it seems equally clear that the governmental interests underlying the Canadian and Mexican treaties do not warrant ignoring that
challenge. In sum, to deny claims casting serious doubt on the question of guilt would, but for the unique circumstances discussed below,
make a mockery of due process.
From all of this, one must admit a genuine possibility that constitutional challenges to the Mexican treaty will fare differently in
comparison to similar challenges to the Canadian treaty. The Mexican treaty promises to thrust the American courts into that second,
largely uncharted region in which vindication of the right of the one
Rights, G.A. Res. 200, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 52-58, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
reprintedin 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 870 (1967).
266. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901).
267. See text accompanying notes 122-31 supra.
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prisoner before the court threatens to jeopardize the return of all
those prisoners still abroad.
B.

ONE AGAINST MANY

As already noted, the case of the returned prisoner will differ
from all the cases that we have reviewed. When the treaties were
made, both the prisoners and the government sought the same benefit from a foreign government that exacted a certain price for its
cooperation. If there is any conflict, it is principally between the
interests of the prisoners who have returned and of society in the
values they espouse, on the one hand, and the prisoners who remain
abroad and the government, on the other. The question is whether,
in light of this fact, the balance we have adduced thus far shifts
decisively.
In all probability, the number of returned prisoners who may be
able to raise a serious constitutional challenge-a claim of innocence-will be much smaller than the number of prisoners remaining
abroad. This will certainly be true in the initial stages of the threeyear program under the treaties."'8 As the program progresses, the
disparity between these two groups undoubtedly will narrow somewhat, but it is unlikely to approach an equivalence. Hence, it seems
both appropriate and necessary to analyze the problem under the
assumption that a significant disparity will continue throughout the
life of the treaties. Should this prove unfounded in later cases, it must
still be remembered that a judgment invalidating the treaties, especially after a substantial number of prisoners have been returnedafter the disparity has narrowed-would, at the very least, foreclose
use of similar agreements to aid Americans imprisoned in countries
with substantially different legal systems, which probably means
foreclosing aid to people whom, on humanitarian grounds, we most
want to assist. Seen in this broader dimension, it is likely that even
as the Mexican and Canadian programs draw to a close, the prisoners
who have returned will be pitted against other Americans imprisoned abroad. And while there are some caveats to offer, if the
absolute numbers become large, it seems appropriate for the courts
to act on the assumption that there will be a continuing disparity
between these groups.
From this last point, at least two considerations emerge that
substantially mitigate the compelling weight or urgency that would
otherwise attend the returned prisoners' claims. First, any threat that
a denial of those claims would pose to society's wider interest in the
268.

See Canadian Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII, para. 2; Mexican Treaty,

supra note 1, art. X, para. 2.
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integrity of its institutions and values would seem measurably diminished if the denial stemmed not solely from the government's desire
to serve its own interests but principally from its desire to alleviate
the suffering of Americans imprisoned abroad. The humanitarian
motive, and the essential neutrality of the government in the decision
to deprive the prisoners of their rights, suggests a diminished concern
for institutional integrity. Second, any danger that a denial of the
returned prisoners' claims would offend the nation's basic commitment to the individual and his liberties is diminished because that
commitment itself seems somewhat less compelling when the individual seeks a vindication of his rights at the expense of others who
may have suffered precisely the same deprivations.
In this connection, while the American courts do not refuse to
redress constitutional deprivations merely because they wish to
avoid visiting hardship upon others similarly situated, that is not invariably so. In a domestic setting, if the vindication of one person's
rights may cause others to suffer, it generally lies within the power
of the American government to alleviate that suffering." 9 In the international setting, this possibility often is far more remote. Too often,
as in the prisoners' cases, the hardships consequent upon a vindication of one person's rights flow from the actions of a foreign government over which the American government has no control. This basic
reality has led the courts in appropriate cases to withhold the judicial
redress of rights where such redress might visit greater hardships
upon others who have suffered similar deprivations but are unable to
bring themselves within the jurisdiction of the courts.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino0 is the classic case in
point. There, Justice Harlan unequivocally held that among the principal functional underpinnings of a refusal to adjudicate under the
aegis of the "act of state" doctrinel' in expropriation cases was the
need to protect the interests of those victims of foreign expropriations
who could not seek judicial redress.2 2 Although the act of state doctrine technically is not applicable23 and should not be extended to
269. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (students facing temporary suspension from public school have property and liberty interests qualifying for due process
protection); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (pre-termination hearing necessary
prior to removal of statutory welfare benefits).
270. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
271. See id. at 431-32.
272. As Justice Harlan pointed out, the political departments could engage in
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy and resort to economic and political sanctions in

efforts to obtain general redress for American victims of the foreign state action.
"Judicial determinations of invalidity of title, [could], on the other hand, have only
occasional impact .

. .

. Piecemeal dispositions of this sort involving the probability

of affront to another state could seriously interfere" with the efforts of the executive.
Id.
273. Our problem involves a challenge to the acts of the American government,
with the validity of the acts of a foreign government being called into question only
derivatively because the American government proposes to execute the latter. It would
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our case, its broader protective principle seems quite apposite. If, in
its more recent act of state decisions,2' the Supreme Court seems to
have lost sight of this basic purpose, the problems that have resulted
serve only to emphasize its importance.25
On the other hand, innocent citizens will be the ones imprisoned.
In some longer span of time the bitterness of those prisoners, the
travesty of justice that their imprisonment represents, and the suspicion that they remain in prison only because the American government does not wish to offend a foreign power may come to dominate
our own and the world's perception of this otherwise humane enterprise. In assessing this prospect, the courts cannot ignore the possibility that if they uphold the Mexican and Canadian treaties, similar
arrangements with other countries will follow, increasing the numbers of wrongfully imprisoned Americans.
Moreover, in the case of the returned prisoners, it is constitutional rights that are at stake; in the case of prisoners remaining
abroad, only an improvement in the conditions of their imprisonment
is involved. To find this latter interest the more compelling of the two
would be to leave all constitutional deprivations-those of the prisoners who have returned as well as those who remain behind-without
effective redress.
In sum, the problem is a most difficult one, with little guidance
from precedent. In this circumstance, we are tempted to offer our own
essentially subjective appraisal that, on balance, the due process calculus has indeed changed and that the continued sentence provision
of the treaties should be upheld. We can avoid reliance upon such
impulses, however, by resort to one of the fundamental disciplining
elements of our own methodology. Invariably, as the courts move
toward the apparent necessity of subjective judgment and away from
the guidance of history, they encounter, by definition, the case of the
uncertain calculus. And as uncertainty increases, the political judgment becomes less suspect.
Equally important, we cannot forget that when a compromise
with constitutional values appears trivial compared with the larger
objects that would be served thereby, a failure to compromise can
discredit the values themselves. While we cannot know with certainty
whether we have arrived at such a place, it is a possibility. The
numbers of those with credible claims-those of doubtful guilt-will
simply be inappropriate to convert a due process inquiry into an "act of state"inquiry
merely because the case has foreign policy overtones, especially since these latter
considerations can be fully taken into account in the due process formula.
274. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976);
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
275. See Swan, supra note 188, at 864-70.
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be very limited when compared with those who otherwise would be
left to suffer. In light of this uncertainty and the distance we have
moved from established principles, it would seem that we have a
classic case for judicial restraint. In the end, the political departments' judgment in this matter represents an "uneasy but reasonable
response to most troublesome questions.""" There can be little justification for imposing on the nation the judiciary's particular solution
to the problem.

276.

Epstein, supra note 45, at 185.

